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Abstract 
 
This thesis concerns the role of atomic power in the development of British national 
identity and international relations between the end of the Second World War and the early 
nineteen-sixties. It deals with the changing nature of interaction with the United States, 
Europe and Commonwealth through the focus of new science as well as the impact of civil 
atomic power on British society and political decision-making structures. A new space for 
Britain in the context of Cold-War relations is identified in the field of atomic science, as 
Britain‟s development of independent nuclear weapons and subsequently civil electrical 
engineering ran counter to the otherwise prevalent trend of declining great power status. The 
thesis concludes that the atomic energy program in Britain was an important component in the 
definition of a new post-war identity, with increased scientific input into government policy 
ultimately resulting in Britain developing a potential for commercial uses which was a key 
factor in prompting American intervention in the European atomic arena during the nineteen-
fifties. It also contends that the politics of European integration around the Treaty of Rome 
were substantially informed by British attitudes towards her atomic power legacy. 
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„The discovery of this atomic energy science has placed us several laps ahead of the 
present phase of international political development, and unless we can catch up politically to 
the point we have reached in science, and thus command the power which at present threatens 
us, we are all going to be blown to smithereens!‟ 
- Anthony Eden, House of Commons, 22
nd
 November 1945 
  
 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Described as „the work of men of genius‟ by the eminent scientist John Cockcroft, but 
„a great and dangerous adventure‟ by President Truman, few issues during the twentieth 
century proved as controversial as the exploitation of nuclear fission
1
. In post-war Britain, the 
advent of a new technological era raised fundamental questions about the British attitude to 
science and its international implications while global relationships within the energy 
environment shifted rapidly as new military and domestic atomic issues forced their way into 
existing frameworks. It is the purpose of this analysis to detail the internal and external impact 
of atomic technology on British diplomacy and society, beginning with the scientists who 
developed the original knowledge and were thereafter invaluable to the post-war nuclear 
programme.  
Enough has already been written to contextualise a weighty study; Margaret Gowing‟s 
Independence and Deterrence (1974) and R.F. Pocock‟s Nuclear Power: Its Development in 
the United Kingdom (1977) both launched the initial commentary on Britain‟s first-generation 
atomic plants. Gowing‟s analysis (often considered the field-grounding text) utilised the focus 
of individuals operating the first British nuclear experiments to divide nuclear power 
development into policy-making and policy-enactment phases, producing depth widely absent 
in the field
2
. However, the relatively brief period covered (from 1945-52) left gaps beyond the 
first nuclear planning phases. This space was partly filled by Pocock, who, in contrast to 
Gowing‟s highly-detailed account, charted the wider history of atomic power but still sought 
to break the Magnox era into two distinct periods: the „years of military priority‟ from 1945-
1953 and the era of commercial generation thereafter
3
. Where others had dismissed civil 
                                                     
1 John Cockcroft, „Future of Atomic Energy‟, The Scientific Monthly, Vol. 82, No. 3 (Mar., 1956), p. 136 and „The Atomic 
Era‟, The Manchester Guardian, 16th April, 1946 
2
 Margaret Gowing, Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945-1952, Vol. I., (London, 1974) 
3 R.F. Pocock, Nuclear Power: Its Development in the United Kingdom, (London, 1977), p. 19 
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power as a by-product of bomb-making, Pocock decreased the emphasis on military 
plutonium requirements, offering instead that nuclear power was a necessary response to 
global energy crises and increasingly costly coal
4
.  
The temporal divisions provided by these works agree that atomic history crossed a 
military phase before becoming a predominantly commercial concern roughly halfway in the 
period of study. This offers a reasonable framework to begin this analysis, as these shifting 
priorities can be tracked before the role of independent civil applications are investigated. 
Indeed, much existing scholarship surrounding the West‟s nuclear past has too often ignored 
the none-martial aspects of fission technology; this assessment will therefore follow the 
evolution of British policy through the early atomic age, starting with developments in Anglo-
American diplomacy. British scientists had been crucial to the success of the Manhattan 
Project and were heavily involved in the fundamental stages of developing martial atomic 
power, yet were refused American resources and expertise almost immediately after the war. 
This assertion of a US atomic monopoly carried consequences for British atomic policy, 
making the impact of this development on wider Anglo-American relations a key issue for 
examination. Important arguments in this field already exist; Timothy Mitchell and David 
Painter framed a good general context for this analysis in their research into American 
interference in post-war European energy systems
5
. Additionally, John Baylis noted how 
America‟s refusal to co-operate for the first post-war years scuppered notions of 
interdependence, forcing a fundamental frame-shift in thinking, firstly at political, but later 
scientific levels, legitimising an independent British nuclear infrastructure
6
. This provides 
important background for study of another significant phenomenon: the impact of Britain‟s 
                                                     
4 R.F. Pocock, Nuclear Power: Its Development in the United Kingdom, pp. 46-7 
5 For examples, see David Painter, „Oil and the Marshall Plan‟, The Business History Review, Vol. 58, No. 3 (Autumn, 1984) 
and Timothy Mitchell, „Carbon Democracy‟, Economy and Society, (Volume 38, Number 3, Aug. 2009) 
6 John Baylis, „Exchanging Nuclear Secrets: Laying the Foundations of the Anglo-American Nuclear Relationship‟, 
Diplomatic History, Volume 25, Issue 1, (Winter 2001), p. 35 
 3 
 
atomic power on relations with its former empire. Fission technology and nuclear fuels 
affected the redefinition of British influence in erstwhile dominions as the presence of 
uranium deposits in Commonwealth states generated diplomatic tension over the trade 
between technology and primary resources, articulating contrasting visions for the 
organisation.  
Importantly, although the theoretical background of nuclear science took some 
account of energy-generating applications, the initial implementation of uranium fission 
technology was almost exclusively military. However, this thesis will restrict itself to 
examining nuclear power in a civil context, except when both applications become 
inextricably intertwined, notably during the initial post-war stages. The abrupt relationship 
changes with Britain‟s dominions (the traditional source of strength) and her core ally 
encouraged the development of an independent British nuclear programme; thus, the next step 
will be to analyse how Britain‟s post-war energy and military needs utilised scientific 
discoveries which could „kill two birds with one stone‟ and provided electricity-generating 
potential through civil engineering schemes. A core debate in this field concerns whether this 
development represented a positive assertion of British independence or, as William Walker 
posited, a negatively-stimulated reaction to American frostiness
7
. In expanding the discussion, 
this analysis will identify the influence of atomic scientists within new organisational 
frameworks and in the context of the wider phenomenon prevalent in the nineteen-fifties 
described by Joseph Camilleri as the „bureaucratisation of science‟8. 
Evaluating the energy options competing with traditional coal power and the political 
events which decided their fates will open discussion on the extent to which science can be 
understood to have national identity, and the frontier between scientists working for national 
                                                     
7 William Walker and Måns Lönnroth, Nuclear Power Struggles: Industrial Competition and Proliferation Control, (London, 
1983), pp. 6-7 
8 Joseph A. Camilleri, The State and Nuclear Power: Conflict and Control in the Western World, (Brighton, 1984), pp. 13-16 
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benefit and those pursuing the global good will be carefully identified. Interpretations of the 
role of science within the contrasting political contexts of Labour and Conservative policy, 
the economics of fuel, and wider international trends have been developed in isolation, so 
elaborating and synthesising these multiple elements will facilitate analysis of atomic power‟s 
overall impact on Britain‟s domestic and global position.  
This initial reaction brought about the next phase of atomic history, as the United 
States attempted to coerce and persuade its ally into assisting her nuclear defence programmes 
and visions for a united Europe. Finding a position for this study within the existing 
historiographical framework provides rich possibilities as current scholarship adopts a broadly 
US-centric approach, with attendant emphasis on martial atomic applications and American 
Cold War position. However, the influence of Britain‟s civil success has avoided significant 
attention, so whilst the work of, say, John Krige or Richard Hewlett provides solid 
fundamentals, they concurrently create space for an expansion of established arguments
9
. This 
analysis will therefore elaborate on how far the liberalisation of American atomic policy 
under Eisenhower reflected the nuclear accession of both the USSR (the currently-accepted 
argument) and Great Britain. The British position in pioneering atomic technology was 
unique among European states undergoing radical politico-economic alterations and 
movement towards integration deviated significantly from traditional power structures, raising 
questions about Britain‟s continental role, notably in the nuclear field. Therefore, this study 
will focus on the British reaction to European demands for nuclear technology and how these 
influenced the wider response to integration, ultimately producing a two-stream atomic 
politics with Western Europe forming a joined nuclear authority. Here the debate will centre 
on whether Britain‟s reluctance to join Euratom was based on the organisations weakness, as 
                                                     
9 For examples, see Richard Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, Atoms for Peace and War, 1953-1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic 
Energy Commission, (Berkeley, 1989) and John Krige, „Atoms for Peace, Scientific Internationalism and Scientific 
Intelligence‟, Osiris, Vol. 21, No. 1, (2006) 
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Christian Deubner has asserted, or more cynical reasons of hegemony, as Henry Nau 
contended
10
. In either case, the atomic frontier, through which American desires for British 
agency in a united Europe were expressed, merits investigation into the role of civil atomic 
power in informing Britain‟s (in)activity in continental affairs. In this way it will be possible 
to shed new light on wider traditional debates.  
Finally, the effect of atomic power on re-orientating social perceptions of Britain‟s 
position and the influence of this domestic reaction on development priorities will be 
examined. This will involve investigating local and national perceptions of civil power 
stations whilst evaluating whether Britain‟s pioneering position engendered public support for 
the new technopolitics that eventually underpinned Harold Wilson‟s „white heat of 
revolution‟. Thus, the analysis will use the lens of energy supply to scrutinise whether the 
„New Britain‟ emerging from post-war austerity was credible or merely a mirage disguising 
relative decline. By drawing together the economic, political and scientific elements of civil 
atomic power, it will be possible to illustrate how the new technology affected Britain‟s world 
position and social identity as scientific influence grew and replaced traditional 
representations of power in the national consciousness. Assessing the role of scientists and 
technocratic elites will enable evaluation of how the demands of atomic power in the post-war 
world influenced the international scene, particularly in relation to the initial debate 
concerning military versus commercial priority highlighted by Gowing and Pocock.  
Churchill's 'three circles' theory provides a good template to analyse Britain's position 
within this new power-political system; the United States, Europe and Commonwealth all 
experienced fluctuating responses from British policies designed to produce a „swing power‟ 
                                                     
10 Christian Deubner, „The Expansion of West German Capital and the Founding of Euratom‟, International Organization, 
Vol. 33, No. 2 (Spring, 1979), p. 223 and Henry Nau, National Politics and International Technology, (London, 1974), pp. 
186-9 
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at the centre of an often-ungainly three-spoked wheel
11
. Atomic energy demonstrated as well 
as any field how Britain alternated quickly between keen interaction and stubborn reluctance 
with her major partners as she sought a new international position. This analysis will thus 
place atomic power within the triple context of imperial decline, Cold War superpower 
struggle and European integration and investigate the manner in which it corresponded to or 
informed these processes. By navigating these core arguments and applying substantial 
original research it will be possible to contextualise this study correctly and further develop 
the scholarly field. 
  
                                                     
11 John Dumbrell, A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After, (London, 2001), pp. 7-8 
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CHAPTER ONE: FROM HIROSHIMA TO THE MODUS VIVENDI 
 
If the Second World War began with stuttering agreements failing to contain fascism, 
it ended with the cataclysmic atomic bombings of Japan. This result represented years of toil; 
early French work was furthered at the University of Birmingham by Otto Frisch and Rudolf 
Peierls, émigrés from Austria and Germany, who concluded that only a few pounds of 
difficult-to-extract uranium-235 were needed to take a bomb critical
12
. Once this scientific 
point was established, the British undertook feasibility studies under the „Maud‟ Committee 
and organised the „Tube Alloys‟ project to investigate practical military applications, but 
despite relocating their effort to Canada in the interest of safety and ease of research they soon 
realised that the engineering costs (approximately £95m) of such a plant would be 
prohibitive
13
. Thus, co-operation with the United States was inevitable and in August 1943, in 
the interests of „wise division of war effort‟, the Quebec Agreement was signed, securing „full 
and effective interchange of information‟ between American and British scientists in 
exchange for Britain disclaiming any post-war industrial atomic interests (enshrined in Clause 
IV). The treaty also required consent from all three signatories before using atomic weapons 
or exchanging information with additional parties
14
. The move prudently traded British 
knowledge that would soon be discovered by the Americans for details of nuclear processes 
that were unachievable in contemporary British facilities. Nonetheless, although the expedient 
wartime plan fairly acknowledged the British intellectual contribution, it tacitly accepted, for 
financial and engineering reasons, that the future of atomic power was American. 
                                                     
12 Atomic Archive, „Frisch-Peierls Memorandum‟, March 1940. [online], (Date Accessed: 1st June 2011) Available from: 
http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Begin/FrischPeierls.shtml 
13 Atomic Archive, „Report by MAUD Committee on the Use of Uranium for a Bomb‟, 1941 [online], (Date Accessed: 1st 
June 2011), Available from: http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Begin/MAUD.shtml 
14  Yale Law School, The Avalon Project: Documents in History, „The „Quebec Agreement‟, „Articles of Agreement 
Governing Collaboration Between the Authorities of the U.S.A. and the U.K. in the Matter of Tube Alloys‟‟, 19th August, 
1943 [online], (Date Accessed: 1st June 2011), Available from: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/q002.asp 
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The agreement established a Combined Policy Committee (CPC) to decide mutual 
atomic policy, joined later by a Combined Development Trust (CDT) to corner global 
uranium supplies. However, in contrast to the 3:2:1 split between the USA, UK and Canada in 
the CPC Board, the CDT was joint-funded and an equal Anglo-American responsibility
15
. 
Thus, as long as the A-Bomb remained a concept for future consideration, Britain enjoyed an 
atomic relationship approaching equality with the United States, to the extent that Roosevelt 
and Churchill even agreed to continue full transatlantic collaboration on military and civil 
atomic energy beyond the (correctly) predicted first use of future weapons to compel Japanese 
surrender
16
. Therefore, although the wartime atomic relationship remained cordial, superior 
American engineering capabilities ensured that future British development of the new 
technology would require negotiation with her senior ally. 
However, Roosevelt‟s death in April 1945 and the British general election the 
following July changed the leadership on both sides of the Atlantic. The close understanding 
faltered as Attlee and Truman stepped in to „mop up‟ the war without any previous meeting, 
having inherited a tight working relationship between their predecessors. Into this uneasy 
political mix was thrown atomic power‟s transition from theory to reality, an important factor 
for international relations. Truman was conscious that fission processes were widely-known 
and believed that other powers would inevitably develop atomic bombs, making him eager to 
exploit America‟s position to instigate effective international control mechanisms while her 
                                                     
15 NuclearFiles.Org: Project of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, „Anglo-American Declaration of Trust‟, 13th June, 1944 
[online], (Date Accessed: 1st June 2011), Available from: http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-
weapons/history/pre-cold-war/manhattan-project/declaration-of-trust_1944-06-13.htm 
16 NuclearFiles.Org: Project of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, „The Roosevelt-Churchill "Tube Alloys" Deal‟, 19th 
September, 1944, (Date Accessed: 1st June 2011), Available from: http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-
weapons/history/pre-cold-war/manhattan-project/tube-alloys-deal_1944-09-19.htm 
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technological premiership remained
17
. Henry Stimson, Secretary of War, advocated swift 
tripartite consultation with Britain and Russia on the future of commercial atomic energy but 
this approach was rejected by Attlee, who was encouraged to share neither knowledge nor 
uranium with the Soviets until relations improved, saving the possibility of some „substantial 
advantage‟18. Instead, the Prime Minister proposed to use the period before Russia‟s 
inevitable proliferation to formulate control agencies, and in return for supporting Truman on 
this point Attlee arranged a meeting in Washington in November with the intention of 
retaining the Quebec Agreement as far as possible whilst freeing Britain to act on industrial 
atomic power without American intervention. His thesis contended that atomic energy, being 
too widespread a concept to contain, should be freely developed but leashed by the threat of 
massive retaliation from other nuclear states if strict codes of conduct were not followed
19
. 
Whilst much of this sentiment was included in the public Washington Declaration of 
the 15
th
 November 1945, which called for a UN Commission to control international atomic 
energy, a more important development was the signing the following day of the secret 
„Groves-Anderson memorandum‟. The document downgraded the Quebec-mandated 
prerequisite for nuclear strikes to consultation with rather than agreement between the three 
Allies, specified that no atomic information be shared with additional parties and ordered the 
acquisition of all available uranium sources „by purchase or otherwise‟ for stockpile under the 
CDT
20
. Crucially, this last point gave the United States equal rights (via the CPC) in the 
distribution of ores it had no previous claim over, allowing stockpiling to begin
21
. However, 
in exchange for releasing the vast majority of potential uranium resources, Britain found 
                                                     
17 President Harry S Truman, „Message to Congress on the Atomic Bomb‟ Washington D.C., 3rd October  1945 
18 Henry L. Stimson, „Memorandum to President Truman on Control of Atomic Weapons, 11th September 1945‟, quoted in 
Richard D. Challener (ed.), From Isolation to Containment, 1921-1952: Three Decades of American Foreign Policy from 
Harding to Truman, (London, 1970), pp. 136-139 and NA CAB/129/4 „International Control of Atomic Energy, Prime 
Minister‟s Memorandum‟, 5th November 1945 
19 Ibid. 
20 „Groves-Anderson Memorandum; 16th November 1945‟, quoted in Margaret Gowing, Independence and Deterrence: 
Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945-1952, Vol. I., p. 85 
21 Jonathan Helmreich, Gathering Rare Ores: The Diplomacy of Uranium Acquisition, (Princeton, 1986), p. 107 
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agreement on drafting a new document to supersede Quebec and finally rid herself of the 
much-hated Clause IV. Thus, Britain found itself (atomically) immeasurably poorer but 
significantly more independent.     
Despite this rebalancing, the new accords soon proved troublesome. Attlee, already 
irked by the abrupt termination of Lend-Lease in September 1945, was keen to maintain 
strong Anglo-American relations whilst preserving respect for British intentions. 
In his initial post-Washington House of Commons address, the Prime Minister described 
atomic energy as the collective property of all three Quebec signatories and proposed that 
technological information be negotiated on a reciprocal basis from interested parties through a 
future United Nations Organisation
22
. However the progress of the McMahon Bill, which 
proposed isolating atomic technology within America, worried Attlee considerably and he 
wrote to Truman in April 1946 requesting an explanation regarding the refusal of American 
CPC members to share information on constructing atomic plants in the UK
23
. Truman replied 
that, in his view, the Washington agreements were „very general‟ and did not oblige the USA 
to offer practical post-war help
24
. Attlee protested this point lengthily to both Truman and 
Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King throughout the second quarter of 1946, but the 
President was reconciled to wait for the decision of Congress before responding 
meaningfully
25
. British trust was severely damaged; the loose wartime cordiality was 
demonstrably dead and the inability to formulate a strong post-war settlement preyed on the 
Labour government who became increasingly anxious for atomic information, not only for 
defence but increasingly as a cheap source of industrial power. Before the McMahon debate 
was truly underway, Attlee requested an organisation to control British fissile material and 
                                                     
22 Clement Attlee, House of Commons Debate, 22nd November 1945, Hansard , HC Deb., Vol. 416. cc601-714 
23 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Volume II: Years of Trial and Hope, 1946-52,  (New York, 1987), p. 12 
24 Ibid., p. 13 
25 Francis Williams, A Prime Minister Remembers: The War and Post-war Memoirs of the Rt.Hon. Earl Attlee, (London, 
1961), pp. 112-119 
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although weapons were foremost on his mind, fuel shortages were fostering notions that 
atomic science held a potential solution. Therefore, Attlee proposed a programme to develop 
atomic technology „as circumstances might require‟, keeping open possible future civil 
applications
26
. 
Truman, for his part, was under pressure from the Treasury Department to reorganise 
the American economy onto a peace footing and cut government spending, while hawks in 
Congress needed placating with measures to restrict the spread of atomic power beyond the 
US
27
. Some commentators have also noted that, despite his public applause for new scientific 
achievements, the president was wracked by „nagging apprehension‟ that the scientists‟ blind 
pursuit of atomic technology would produce an almost-biblical apocalypse
28
. Furthermore, the 
establishment of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (USAEC) under civilian 
control, in the interest of „established American tradition‟, had come at a price29. The 
McMahon Bill had received solid support in both American houses and, upon being signed in 
August 1946, provided for the complete cessation of international information exchange on 
industrial atomic power until Congress declared that military uses were appropriately 
internationally safeguarded
30
. Indeed, the military wing in Congress had negotiated a liaison 
committee within the USAEC which could refer any disagreeable decisions to the President 
via the Secretaries of War and Navy
31
. This was incredibly significant for the transatlantic 
atomic relationship; any future British access to American knowledge would be severely 
restricted as the US military guarded the gateway to atomic information and through it a 
                                                     
26 NA CAB 128/5, „Minutes of a Cabinet Meeting‟, 17th January 1946 
27 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Volume II: Years of Trial and Hope, 1946-52, pp. 4-5, p. 35 
28 Paul Boyer „„Some Sort of Peace‟: President Truman, the American People and the Atomic Bomb‟ in Michael J. Lacey 
(ed.), The Truman Presidency, (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 174-202 
29 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Volume II: Years of Trial and Hope, 1946-52,  (New York, 1987), pp. 3-6 
30 United States Atomic Energy Act, 1946, Section 10a(2) 
31 Ibid., Section 2.4c 
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controlling interest in industrial applications. This continuing military context in American 
atomic policy left Britain essentially isolated. 
The result of this was profound; British involvement in wartime atomic projects in 
Canada and Los Alamos produced a base of scientists returning to British universities with 
first-hand experience but lacking facilities to cultivate the new technology; a crucial factor in 
future developments. In January 1946, Attlee commissioned an atomic energy organisation 
under the Ministry of Supply to strengthen Britain‟s position at the United Nations Atomic 
Energy Commission (UNAEC) and more importantly create a unified voice and point of 
contact regarding the technology in Britain, thereby improving her negotiating position with 
the United States
32
. Despite this, relations worsened, as British protests received obfuscation 
and denial of precisely which agreements still represented what to whom
33
. This truculence 
left many in the British Cabinet concerned about recurring American isolationism, 
particularly in relation to defence commitments, increasing the importance of acquiring an 
independent atomic deterrent in the interests of security and, importantly, national respect
34
. 
Relations deteriorated further during 1947 as Britain continued to stockpile its Congolese ore 
allocation whilst American plants protested their short supply; hawks in the Senate were also 
unhappy at the proximity of British fissile material to Russia and that the fifty-fifty split of 
materials did not reflect the vastly different demands of America and the UK
35
. Britain, for its 
part was happy to accept its uranium entitlement under CDT contracts valid until 1956 (and 
which it paid in sterling, not rare dollars), demonstrating further her intention to press existing 
settlements to the maximum.  
                                                     
32 NA CAB/128/5, „Minutes of a Cabinet Meeting‟, 8th April 1946 
33 James L. Gormly, „The Washington Declaration and the “Poor Relation”: Anglo-American Atomic Diplomacy, 1945-46‟, 
Diplomatic History, Volume 8, Issue 2, (April 1984), pp. 141-143 
34 John Baylis, „Exchanging Nuclear Secrets: Laying the Foundations of the Anglo-American Nuclear Relationship‟, p. 35 
35 Jonathan Helmreich, Gathering Rare Ores: The Diplomacy of Uranium Acquisition, pp. 122-123 
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Notably, although global uranium scarcity caused friction with Belgium, where the 
government realised the rising value of stocks it was contributing at very low prices for little 
return, Britain remained unwilling to engage extensively with Europe, her attention being 
consumed by the United States
36
. This point bears analysis; post-war Britain identified itself 
increasingly in relation to its primary alliance, and whilst atomic energy represented a 
dependence on America which was consistent with developments elsewhere, the response in 
this particular sector was different. Economically, material shortages were covered by loans 
and the Marshall Plan whilst Britain acknowledged military inferiority and conceded 
American hegemony in occupied Germany, Greece and the Middle East. However, in the 
atomic field, dependence was refused and Britain demanded equality, railing against 
American attempts to demote her importance. Thus, as Margaret Gowing noted, the atomic 
sector represented an important deviation from wider Anglo-American co-operation during 
the post-war forties
37
. It was certainly an important demonstration of the limits acceptable to 
Britain in the new world order.  
Nonetheless, uranium shortages forced the Americans back to the negotiating table to 
claim some of Britain‟s hoarded stocks. The resulting agreement, the Modus Vivendi, 
attempted to break the effective stalemate in atomic relations by allocating all Congolese 
uranium for 1948 and 1949 to the United States and allowing her to tap unused British 
stockpiles to supplement any shortfall to the requirements of her „minimum programme‟38. 
This clause alone demonstrated the gulf between American and British needs, with the former 
requiring over ten-thousand tons of uranium ore for two years and the latter barely two-
thousand
39
. In exchange, the United States offered to release limited scientific information 
                                                     
36 Margaret Gowing, Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945-1952, Vol. I., pp. 152-159, 366-367 
37 Ibid., p. 10, pp. 241-242 
38 „The Modus Vivendi’, 7th January, 1948, quoted in Ibid., pp. 266-272 
39 Ibid. 
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and technical knowledge, which, importantly, they insisted on categorising into suitable areas 
where sharing could be justified in the national interest. It thus fell to scientists to instigate an 
agreement where politicians had failed; John Cockcroft, Vannevar Bush and James Fisk 
negotiated information-sharing treaties on nine key topics, whittled down from Cockcroft‟s 
fourteen original proposals
40
.  
The Modus Vivendi also identified a new international atomic position for Britain as 
the controlling „gateway‟ to new Commonwealth resources, a role of some importance as the 
negotiators envisaged rapidly increasing contributions to world uranium supplies after 1950 
from South Africa (Figure I). The agreement detailed British commitments to her erstwhile 
colonies specifically, in order to „secure information‟ held by Commonwealth scientists, 
effectively accepting that, as America remained inhospitable, they would invariably work at 
the Atomic Energy Research Establishment (AERE) at Harwell, join a British university or 
return home. This reassertion of post-imperial British power also had implications for Europe; 
the definition of what Ernest Bevin termed the „Third Force‟ was soon readjusted to mean not 
merely an American-sponsored British-led Western European bloc but British leadership 
within a continental structure of equal strategic importance to the US
41
. Thus, Britain‟s 
influence was still accorded a position of some respect, allowing her to consider releasing 
rights on Belgian Congo uranium in the expectation that future Canadian, Australian and 
South African supplies could be more easily accumulated. Being within the traditional British 
sphere, these were jealously guarded; in late 1949 George Strauss, the Minister of Supply, 
was asked to „make a real effort to see that our experience in relation to uranium from South 
Africa does not follow that of the Belgians in the Congo, where the Americans have taken the 
                                                     
40 Margaret Gowing, Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945-1952, Vol. I, pp. 245-6 
41 Ibid., p. 242 
 15 
 
lot‟42.  Indeed, belief in Commonwealth uranium meant the British considered jettisoning 
their Congolese agreements in favour of new sources despite the prevalent assumption that 
uranium requirements would soon skyrocket
43
. These negotiations demonstrated that Britain 
was still internationally important and although her Atlantic status was diminished, the 
Commonwealth remained integral to her remaining prestige. 
 
 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 Total U3O8 (short 
tons) 
Belgian Congo 2,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 7,000 
United States 100 200 200 200 200 900 
Canada 150 150 150 150 150 750 
South Africa - - 125 320 825 1,270 
Portugal - - - 50 50 100 
Total 2,450 1,550 1,675 1,920 2,425 10,020 
Figure I: Predicted Sources of Uranium, 1948-52
44
 
 
To summarise, although Commonwealth leadership shored-up her image somewhat, 
the post-war period severely altered the political perception of Britain in America. Empire and 
Churchill were replaced by a Labour government coping with fuel shortages and rebellious 
workers; Britain was economically crippled, susceptible to communism and possible Soviet 
attack
45
. Anthony Eden‟s exhortation to „abate present ideas of sovereignty‟ and incorporate 
atomic energy into the international set-up was not widely appreciated; in Washington, 
General Groves was sceptical of any further atomic interchange, questioning why Britain, 
America‟s ally, even needed atomic bomb plants46. Even modest analysis highlights the 
relationship as fundamentally flawed; America had a strong lobby advocating isolationism on 
defence grounds but was forced to engage occasionally to secure uranium supplies whereas 
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Britain was compelled to exert serious patience between these sporadic flashes of friendliness, 
often the only factor keeping the atomic relationship alive in the gloomy post-McMahon 
years. Thus, the Modus Vivendi, as Jonathan Helmreich noted, represented the international 
situation in microcosm; Britain clung to great-power notions of principle whilst the 
Americans pursued pragmatic defence concerns
47
. This complemented contemporary 
misgivings about the handover in international supremacy; Attlee criticised Truman‟s 
„inconsistency‟ in demanding free trade whilst retaining protectionist devices and protested 
America‟s „lack of tact‟ in exploiting its position as international creditor for profit48.  
Robin Edmonds has (rather generously) argued that the British accepted these constant 
humiliations because select „atomically initiated‟ elites considered atomic science crucial to 
the Anglo-American relationship
49
. Had it not been for the realisation of Cabinet members 
like Bevin and Attlee that Britain‟s atomic future would still require tough negotiations with 
the United States, the opportunity to build a lasting special agreement might have been lost. 
However, an alternate view proposed by William Walker identified a more assertive British 
policy designed to maintain national greatness and remain independent of American military 
hegemony
50
.  This point carries weight, especially when one considers the British willingness 
to spend millions pursuing an independent programme; it is therefore perhaps clearer to 
contend that Britain was merely squeezing existing agreements dry. Britain‟s politicians were 
operating from an unknown position; engineering dependence and formal political agreements 
ensured their actions depended first on anticipating American movements; Attlee and Truman 
enjoyed little of the trust visible between Churchill and Roosevelt and the atomic field 
reflected accurately the apprehension of the initial post-war years. Nonetheless, the 
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breakdown in Anglo-American relations must not be conveniently attributed to new 
leadership. Attlee himself blamed Senatorial greed and Congressional short-sightedness in 
passing the McMahon Act, after which Britain „had to go it alone‟ in order to „hold up <their> 
position vis-a-vis the Americans‟51. Repeated attempts at compromise failed because British 
expectations always exceeded what the Americans were prepared to concede; „the egg‟, as 
Margaret Gowing illustrated, was always „addled‟52. One certainty prevailed; the American 
superpower did not regard wartime agreements on atomic energy as an indefinite moral 
obligation, so Britain needed to catch up quickly, „reinventing the wheel‟ if necessary, to 
achieve transatlantic parity
53
. As Christopher Hinton, later the Managing Director of the 
UKAEA‟s Industrial Group remarked, „when we started in 1946 the Americans had a lead of 
four years on us and those were years in which they had an overriding priority‟54. Thus, 
Britain proceeded, for better or worse, alone on its quest for atomic power.  
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CHAPTER TWO: BRITAIN; COAL, OIL AND NEW SCIENCE 
 
In 1948, the physicist Philip Burton Moon argued that civilian nuclear power could 
proceed only once „uranium, expert scientific and technical knowledge of the subject, and 
great engineering strength have been brought together and used on the job for a good many 
years‟55. Moon continued, speculating that no single state, not even the USA, could yet 
command sufficient strength in all three domains to launch a successful civilian project
56
. Of 
the three, obtaining uranium supplies was arguably the simplest criterion and will thus be 
analysed last. The real challenge, certainly in a British context, was how scientific research 
was organised and suitable plant provided, particularly in reference to the interaction these 
factors had with successive political regimes and changing diplomatic environments. 
The relationship between scientist and state had been tightened by Winston 
Churchill‟s inclusion of the physicist Frederick Lindemann (later Lord Cherwell) in his 
wartime advisory circle. The atomic bombings of Japan set the agenda for the future of 
weapons technology and international politics, increasing government interest in science 
regarding issues of national security and consequently, international position. However, 
scientific autonomy was a politically divisive issue rooted in disputes over whether nuclear 
power was a civilian or martial matter. The Labour Government of 1945-51 enjoyed military 
backing in maintaining centralised authority, keeping nuclear research closely bound to the 
Ministry of Supply via the 1946 Atomic Energy Act
57
. For their part, British scientists (with 
the notable exception of Cherwell) did not actively seek political power, often preferring to 
extend their influence indirectly, commonly to address their uneasiness at martial 
developments in nuclear physics. As early as 1941, the chemist Maurice Stacey, working on 
                                                     
55 UBSC US16/E.32 Philip Moon Collection, „Draft on Atomic Power annotated „BBC-First draft, 1948‟, p. 6  
56 Ibid. 
57 United Kingdom Atomic Energy Act, 1946 
 19 
 
„Tube Alloys‟, reported that „the prospect was too much‟ for some scientists working on even 
fundamental bomb technology, causing resignations on ethical grounds
58
. Others, notably 
Joseph Rotblat, criticised the „„success‟ of the Manhattan Project‟ and quit in 1944 once 
Germany abandoned its nuclear bomb project. Many physicists in particular expressed their 
views through apolitical non-proliferation movements such as the Association of Los Alamos 
Scientists, established in 1945. In Britain, Rotblat himself established the Pugwash 
Conferences in 1957, which like CND (formed the same year), aimed to reduce the likelihood 
of nuclear war
59
. A detailed analysis of these movements is beyond the scope of this study but 
it can be reasonably asserted that, although they eschewed direct political power, scientists did 
seek representation on issues they believed important. In America, for example, scientists had 
been instrumental in preventing continued military control of atomic energy
60
. Although 
many scientists continued to support their states by researching contentious military projects, 
the increasing confidence felt by experts in their right of expression meant that relations with 
politicians were rarely one-way. 
 
Nonetheless the first British atomic piles, built at Windscale in the early fifties to 
produce military plutonium, had demonstrated valuably that nuclear reactors could operate 
successfully, raising the possibility of civil plants for energy production. The political will to 
investigate commercial atomic power followed, as the 1951 election produced a Conservative 
government with a predilection for decentralised scientific control, as evidenced by 
Churchill‟s subsequent decision to order a thorough investigation into atomic research 
organisation. This greater openness was important, and the Waverly Committee, after 
studious consultation with both the political and scientific personnel directly engaged in 
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atomic energy, recommended running the effort, in the interests of productivity, as an 
industrial organisation rather than a government department
61
. 
The new approach was further underpinned by the Prime Minister‟s decision to invite 
Lord Cherwell, a strong advocate of nuclear power, back into the Cabinet as Paymaster-
General. As one of the only scientists directly involved in political processes, Cherwell 
pressed for a system similar to the United States, where government research was often 
transferred into the private field. This had notable advantages, such as increasing efficiency 
and reducing costs, but had been opposed by the Attlee government as unsuitable for what 
was still a purely military project
62
. However, as the economic and national prestige benefits 
of pursuing the new technology materialised, nuclear science claimed an increased role in 
state affairs and Cherwell‟s ideas gained support. Individual government departments were 
already appointing scientific advisers who thought in national contexts, as demonstrated in 
1951 by the Chief Scientist of the Ministry of Fuel and Power, Harold Cox, who 
recommended developing atomic power if only to „acquire a know-how which we could sell 
to others‟63. This national thinking affected even Britain‟s greatest ally, with Cox stressing 
that Britain „must not leave all export of these commodities to the US‟64. Political awareness 
of the need for scientific advice elevated atomic experts from departmental to national level, 
as evidenced by the formation of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) in 
1954, with several important scientists, including John Cockcroft and William Penney, on the 
Board
65
.  This reflected a wider prevalent trend; the majority of politicians, with growing 
cross-party support (the motion to improve atomic organisation originated from a Labour 
MP), now appreciated the separate benefits of civil atomic power and supported the scientists‟ 
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earlier request for autonomy
66
. Only the Minister of Supply complained that Cabinet „had 
been influenced too much by the civilian and too little by the military aspects of atomic 
energy‟67. 
The development of nuclear power was both a product and the catalyst of the changing 
philosophy of science and state as technological advances placed technical issues beyond 
politicians and into the hands of highly-educated men whose opinions were increasingly 
sought on important issues.  The situation had developed so much by 1955 that Sir Frederick 
Brundrett, Chief Scientific Advisor to the Ministry of Defence, warned government that 
„unless you incorporate the scientist as a full member of your team you are not turning out 
your First Eleven, and the mistakes that are made will be more numerous and have more 
serious consequences‟68. As technology grew more complex, governments re-evaluated how 
they accessed information; scientists were sufficiently important to request control of their 
specific fields and the formation of talent-pools like the UKAEA allowed research to be run 
more effectively whilst enabling governments to obtain concentrated advice and co-ordinate 
strategy through a single organisation. The evidence for this argument within the existing 
research context is strong; Michael Posner has highlighted how British scientists gained 
power by successfully presenting their learning as an important national interest. 
Additionally, an important nuance has been developed by Joseph Camilleri, who identified 
the nineteen-fifties as a period during which advanced states institutionalised science and, 
with the co-operation of scientists, redirected research towards national goals
69
. Even so, 
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Camilleri acknowledged that the „bureaucratisation of science‟ was less severe in Britain, 
eventually giving the UKAEA a „disproportionate influence‟ in energy planning70. 
Nonetheless, this autonomy had limits; while scientists were free to organise research, 
all Board members were appointed by the Lord President of the Council, a government 
position occupied in 1954 by Lord Salisbury, a long-established Conservative Cabinet 
member
71
. Furthermore, money had to be voted by the Treasury and unspent funds returned to 
state coffers
72
. Although financial control was eventually relaxed, serious governmental 
influence continued; after the 1957 Windscale fire the investigating committee requested 
organisational improvements in addition to the UKAEA remaining cost-effective. 
Nonetheless, these findings were presented as recommendations, not eventual government 
commands
73
. Therefore, it can reasonably be asserted that although scientists expanded their 
influence markedly, firstly through government departments and later autonomous 
organisations, there were important limits. The political acknowledgment that scientists 
presented a strong informational panel ultimately removed atomic power from ministerial 
control, placing it under the direction of experts with less influence from London.  However, 
legal and financial frameworks ensured that although scientists were free to conduct research, 
their influence on top-level decisions would be as consultants. Nonetheless, the development 
of a scientific corps which could effectively advise governmental decisions was pivotal to the 
introduction of nuclear power and the experience in this sector illustrated wider trends 
wherein general scientific development attained increased prominence in government 
considerations throughout the nineteen-fifties. These broad-reaching changes eventually 
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resulted in Labour formalising the role of Chief Scientific Advisor to HM Government in 
1964 to encourage Harold Wilson‟s „white heat of revolution‟74.   
 
The third component of Burton Moon‟s triumvirate necessary for nuclear power, 
engineering, had already been advanced by the post-war demands of British defence 
infrastructure. Eric Hobsbawm argued that without World War Two the atom bomb would 
never have been developed and the subsequent huge expenditures to pursue nuclear electrical 
generation would not have been pursued
75
. Whether or not one agrees with this rather binary 
argument, it can certainly be accepted that the war accelerated the investigation into uranium 
fission for nuclear power; Maurice Stacey himself remarked that the Allied bomb project was 
accelerated „by the fear that the enemy would get there first‟76. Britain had played an 
important role in nuclear bomb research through the „Maud Committee‟ but was forced to 
concede hegemony to the better-supplied American programme with the Quebec Agreement 
of 1943, after which many British minds transferred to the Manhattan Project that eventually 
provided the weapons which ended the war
77
. 
Possession of nuclear weapons was key for continued international prestige in the 
post-war environment, as demonstrated succinctly in autumn 1946 at a meeting of Attlee‟s 
„GEN-75‟ group dedicated to investigating the possibility of a British nuclear deterrent. 
Sensing the committee opposed the idea, Ernest Bevin, the Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, exclaimed „we've got to have this thing over here whatever it costs! We've got to have 
the bloody Union Jack on top of it!‟78 This desire for an independent weapon was all the more 
                                                     
74 David Edgerton, „The „White Heat‟ Revisited: The British Government and Technology in the 1960s‟, Twentieth Century 
British History, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1996, p. 56 
75 Eric Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991, (London, 1994), p. 47 
76 UBSC US15/C.12 Maurice Stacey Collection „Atomic Energy Research at Birmingham 1939-47‟, p. 2 
77 Sheila Durie and Rob Edwards, Fuelling the Nuclear Arms Race: The Links Between Nuclear Power and Nuclear 
Weapons, (London, 1982), pp. 12-13 
78 Peter Hennessy, Cabinets and the Bomb, (Oxford, 2007), p. 7 
 24 
 
pressing after the United States severed all technological and material support under the 1946 
McMahon Act
79
. The result was the construction of the Windscale plutonium-producing 
nuclear plant, begun in September 1947 and completed three years later, during which time a 
second pile was commissioned. However, in the following years, the situation changed 
rapidly; the descent of Europe into Cold War and cooling relations with the USSR, including 
the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, showed that Britain‟s nuclear accession 
required acceleration. These political events dictated an upward revision in military plutonium 
requirements but ran counter to concerns about quantity and security of uranium supply. 
Thus, instead of a third Windscale pile, a uranium enrichment plant was commissioned at 
Capenhurst to increase plutonium yields from the same quantity of imported uranium. The 
need to obtain nuclear weapons was appreciated by scientists also, with Cherwell noting that 
„in the military sphere atomic weapons will soon dwarf all other weapons and perhaps effect 
changes in international relations as great as those once wrought by gunpowder in the political 
structure of Europe‟80 The end product of this engineering development was the first British 
atomic bomb, detonated in October 1952 in north-western Australia
81
. Once again, the 
tightening working relationship between science and state was visible. As Margaret Gowing 
asserted, „the scientists were concerned only that they had fulfilled the exacting and 
exhausting task the government had laid upon them‟ whilst retaining „pride in their scientific 
and technological achievement‟82. 
Nonetheless, the political drive to obtain British nuclear weapons had produced a large 
infrastructure dedicated to uranium fission for bomb-making. It was quickly understood that 
similar technology could be used for civilian purposes and a government report of late 1954 
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concluded that atomic power had „a good chance of proving, within the next 10 years to be 
competitive with electricity generated by conventional methods‟83. R.F. Pocock has argued 
that commercial electricity generation became increasingly significant from 1953 onwards, 
but further examination quickly dispels the idea that weapons production therefore became a 
reduced consideration
84
. The continuing need for economic plutonium greatly informed the 
government‟s next step, to commission an atomic power station based on the PIPPA 
(Pressurised Pile for Producing Power and Plutonium) design at Calder Hall in Cumbria
85
. 
The new station would utilise technological advances to produce plutonium more efficiently, 
reducing uranium needs, but would also use the generated heat (previously released as waste) 
to produce electricity commercially, further reducing costs
86
. In short, plutonium plants were 
built which happened to produce electricity, rather than electrical generators with plutonium 
as a fortunate by-product
87
. The government were especially clear on the station‟s priorities, 
citing directly that „Calder Hall was designed to produce fissile material for military purposes, 
as well as electricity for civil use‟ in that order88. To analyse briefly, it emerges that the push 
towards civil power was substantially consistent with Britain‟s wider post-war context; she 
had to produce atomic bombs to retain „greatness‟ whilst enduring considerable financial 
constraints. Thus, although energy-generating technology originally emerged as an 
accomplice to military uses, the PIPPA reactors also successfully justified independent civil 
atomic power. 
  However, the government acknowledged the technological limitations of an 
expansive civilian nuclear programme, and the 1955 White Paper accepted that until 
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engineers had benefited from operational experience, all new plants would necessarily be of 
the „Magnox‟ design89.  The Magnox plants utilised gas instead of liquid coolants, owing to 
concerns for untested engineering techniques, material cost and safety, and consequently 
suffered low heat-emission and limited power generation
90
. Britain therefore committed itself 
to suffering the disadvantages of the pioneer and installed a generation of reactors which 
quickly became obsolete and more costly than the AGR systems which appeared from the 
mid-sixties. In total, eleven British Magnox stations were built, and although their military 
uses became progressively less significant, martial elements were fundamental to their 
original construction. 
Regardless of military necessity or national prestige, the issue forcing nuclear power 
generation onto the agenda was Britain‟s increasingly unstable post-war fuel supply. On the 
surface, commercial nuclear power made little short-term financial sense, especially for a 
country struggling in the grip of austerity
91
. Even the initial tentative calculations made in 
1950 by the Harwell engineer R.V. Moore accepted that a 90MW nuclear power station 
would cost £9m to build compared to a £5.4m conventional coal station and that the price per 
unit of electricity would be at best two-thirds higher from an atomic plant until significant 
engineering improvements could be achieved
92
. However, the study deliberately refused to 
factor-in any commercial benefit from the produced plutonium, the product which arguably 
inspired the British government to continue with the programme despite the costs. 
Nonetheless, offset against this was the „time bomb‟ of coal supply. As Figure II 
demonstrates, British coal output rose after the war before plateauing in the early 1950s and 
declining at the decade‟s end. However, running counter to the trend of „coming off coal‟ was 
                                                     
89 NA CAB/129/73, „A Programme of Nuclear Power‟, White Paper, February 1955 
90 R.F. Pocock, Nuclear Power: Its Development in the United Kingdom, pp. 23-4 and Peter Lloyd-Jones, The Economics of 
Nuclear Power Programs in the United Kingdom, (London, 1984), p. 9 
91 UK Public Spending, „Statistics for British Public Debt, 1945-55‟ [online], (Date Accessed: 1st June 2011), Available from: 
http://www.ukpublicspending.co.uk 
92 Margaret Gowing, Independence and Deterrence, Britain and Atomic Energy 1945-1952, Vol. II, pp. 282-3, p. 303 
 27 
 
the electricity sector, which enjoyed an increasing share of national coal consumption well 
into the 1960s. This state had been encouraged as early as November 1950 when the Ministry 
of Fuel and Power recommended prioritising coal for electricity generation to avoid repeating 
the disastrous energy cuts of 1947
93
. The tightness of coal was eased by other large 
consumers, notably British Rail, switching to diesel but it soon became clear that the collision 
of the upward trend in coal demand for electricity and the downward turn of supply could not 
be postponed forever
94
. 
 
Figure II: UK Coal Statistics
95
 
The immediate government solution was to increase oil imports, switching notably 
from the USA to Middle-Eastern states as the main provider. However, concerns over supply 
security resulting from the Suez Crisis of 1957 (visibly demonstrated in Figure III) forced the 
British to consider alternative, more politically-reliable energy sources, not least because 
events in Egypt had demonstrated British reliance on increased American imports to cover 
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gaps left by hostilities
96
. The search for an energy solution finally came to rest on the infant 
nuclear programme begun at Calder Hall in October 1956, less than a year earlier. The 
conditions present in Britain in the 1950s were certainly conducive to developing civil atomic 
energy; as John Cockcroft noted, Britain was „a highly industrialised country with small 
hydro- electric resources, poor prospects of any substantial increase in coal production, and a 
rapidly increasing demand for electricity‟97. In contrast to the US and its huge coal reserves, 
nuclear power was „essential‟ for Britain to maintain economic growth. 
 
 
Figure III: British Sources of Oil, 1938-65
98
 
 
Arguably the most attractive feature of uranium fuel was the security of its supply. 
The wartime projects had used Belgian and Canadian sources but even during the war 
politicians noted the potential for co-operation on atomic power within the British sphere of 
influence, a network John Curtin, the Australian Prime Minister, described in 1943 as the 
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„fourth empire‟99. As demonstrated in Chapter I, one of Britain‟s few successes in the late 
forties had been to obtain more uranium than she strictly needed, much to the chagrin of the 
Americans. The CDA contracts continued into the post-war period, supplying Britain with 
Portuguese and Belgian ore sufficient to begin her domestic civil program
100
. Nonetheless, the 
presence of large reserves in politically secure, friendly Commonwealth states such as 
Canada, Australia and South Africa encouraged the British government to pursue close 
connections with erstwhile colonies in the expectation of a profitable exchange that would 
enable a large expansion of her atomic programme. The details of these negotiations will be 
examined in the next chapter. 
The government White Paper of February 1955 acknowledged that coal was unlikely 
to cover Britain‟s rapidly expanding fuel needs, citing the lack of manpower as the main 
obstacle to increasing production. Instead, a tentative nuclear power programme was 
proposed, claiming that, if the Calder Hall experiment proved successful, electricity could be 
„produced commercially in significant quantities within ten years‟101. However, this slightly 
hesitant attitude had already been deemed inadequate by January 1956, when the Minister of 
Fuel and Power proposed accelerating the programme outlined in the White Paper in order to 
increase coal savings
102
. This desperation to transfer to a new fuel before the first commercial 
plant was even completed only deepened as the nineteen-fifties progressed. In 1957, directly 
referencing the problems caused by the Suez Crisis, the Minister of Power enthusiastically 
advocated uranium as a future energy source, citing that „the tonnage that is needed of these 
raw materials is insignificant in volume and the generation of nuclear electricity could 
proceed without fear of such interference with shipping routes and pipelines as has caused the 
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present oil shortage‟103. The conclusion was to recommend an eventual tripling (to 6,000MW) 
of nuclear energy capacity by 1965 with a further acceleration to 12,000MW in the five years 
thereafter
104
. Indeed, by the time one of the last Magnox stations, Dungeness A, was being 
planned in 1959, coal consumption had declined markedly and Macmillan was under pressure 
from mining unions to slow nuclear programmes to boost employment-generating coal 
production (Figure II). However, the Prime Minister heeded his Minister of Power and 
persevered, demonstrating the new importance of nuclear power in British energy politics by 
the end of the decade
105
. 
A consensus on atomic power economics is elusive. Margaret Gowing‟s initial 
analysis was unequivocal; Britain required atomic weapons at all costs, and although it was 
understood at both scientific and political levels that similar technology could produce power, 
military projects took absolute priority. Politicians were sceptical whether the huge capital 
outlay for civil nuclear power would ever be recouped, but acknowledged that contracting 
traditional fuel sources were making the previously uneconomical concept more attractive
106
. 
This view was reappraised relatively quickly by Roger Williams, who believed that nuclear 
programmes were hastened by a premature concern, prevalent across Europe in the early 
fifties, of a looming „energy gap‟ in which oil could only provide temporary respite107. 
Indeed, Williams asserted that violently fluctuating fossil fuel supplies (moving from scarcity 
in the early fifties to abundance later in the decade) initially raised doubts about the economic 
viability of nuclear power and that civil programmes were only undertaken provisionally to be 
„roughly competitive from the outset‟108. However, by the time the plant had been sufficiently 
developed, costs were spiralling and Britain was forced to continue with nuclear power to 
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reduce the losses made on the technological investment. This debate was synthesised 
somewhat by Peter Lloyd-Jones, whose mathematical analysis demonstrated that the first 
Magnox reactors were inefficient even by contemporary standards and built with one eye on 
maintaining fuel supplies from safe, non-communist states, making fossil fuel security 
concerns fundamental to the decision to go nuclear
109
. However, he deemphasised the 
provisional nature of civil stations, arguing that atomic programmes were costly and would 
consequently be expected to play a long role in Britain‟s energy future. Thus, Jones supported 
Williams‟ conclusion that research and development of Britain‟s civil nuclear branch was 
underfunded and rushed, but simultaneously maintained that the cost of atomic power was not 
as concerning as he had implied. Instead, in agreement with Gowing, Jones contended that 
plant construction proceeded despite their inefficiency and cost precisely because both the 
military and the geopolitical fuel situation demanded it
110
. To summarise this debate, it is 
probably fairest to contend that economically, investing in new plant made little short-term 
sense in Britain and while civil power would eventually become an independent concern, its 
beginnings were almost exclusively bound to the redefinition of post-war British geopolitical 
strategy. Nonetheless, although politicians pursued atomic power with little initial interest in 
industrial applications, within five years it became apparent that the technology could solve 
other pressing issues.  
  
Analysing these trends, the development of new technopolitical structures emerges as 
an important part of nineteen-fifties policy making. Labour‟s attempts to contain atomic 
science within centrally-controlled bounds for military purposes were countered by 
subsequent Conservative governments eager to find new approaches to severe pressures 
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bearing down on Britain from multiple angles. While nuclear weapons were the vital asset for 
continuing political credibility, civil atomic power remained pertinent and quickly attained 
importance in the redefinition of British economic identity. In presenting a valuable escape 
from energy pressures, the technology simultaneously strengthened the government‟s hand in 
dealing with domestic coal flow and geopolitical energy crises resulting from the retreat from 
empire whilst fortifying the position of scientists as important to good economic policy 
decisions in the new energy environment. The 1955 White Paper predicted a saving of some 
six million tons of coal annually by 1965 and acknowledged that in an increasingly 
technological era, Britain‟s industrial future depended „on the ability of her scientists to 
discover the secrets of nature‟111. Nonetheless, while it was true that these experts experienced 
increasing influence, it is important to note that organisations like the UKAEA presented a 
unified atomic body which could offer stronger advice rather than impact decision-making 
directly. While new technopolitics required greater consultation, politicians were ultimately 
still free to override scientific opinion; after all, the civil atomic programme was a 
government initiative, within which the UKAEA was formed as a scientific coordinator. The 
scientific role in government policy will be evaluated further in the next chapters. 
The contraction of the British vista produced questions about her identity; would she 
accept a reduced role and expose herself to foreign influence in energy or bullishly assert her 
independence? Atomic power offered the option that electricity supply could remain 
domestically safe through home-grown engineering at the price of removing energy from the 
eye-line of the working-class and placing it in the stratum of incredibly educated scientific 
elites. Although costly, this independence was important; atomic energy relied only on 
uranium supplies sourced from reliable cousins and provided a welcome counterpoint to the 
prevalent trend of British dependence on the United States exemplified by the Marshall Plan 
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and NATO. It also reasserted British willingness to participate at the highest level, despite 
outward decline, regardless of cost. The importance of atomic power was clear before the first 
station was even switched on, demonstrating that although the Magnox stations were built to 
produce power and plutonium, the importance of the former product was rapidly outstripping 
the latter within a few years of Calder Hall opening. Thus, by the mid nineteen-fifties civil 
atomic power was an independent element in the political understanding of Britain‟s changing 
international role and one which proved important in the upcoming years.  
 34 
 
CHAPTER THREE: ‘ATOMS FOR PEACE’; RECONCILIATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
 The next period of Britain‟s atomic history was arguably the most exciting in the 
technology‟s history. Every obstacle had been addressed; the economic rationale for civil 
atomic power had been hastened by energy tightness, the political will to achieve energy 
independence was established and the scientific body had been assembled to enact the work 
with suitable autonomy. The formation of the UKAEA combined scientists into a single 
strong lobby which could advise government effectively on maximising the potential of 
atomic energy. Whilst not an all-powerful interest group, the increased influence of science in 
good state policy ensured that the Authority was able to research improvements and provide 
the technical opinion on „hard-core‟ government initiatives.  
To proceed with industrial programmes, Britain needed to utilise the prestige of its 
new atomic autonomy to negotiate independent uranium agreements. The initial importance 
of South Africa evaporated as the anti-British Malan government ended the costly uranium 
prospecting commissioned by Jan Smuts
112
. South Africa would continue to supply uranium 
through the CDA only, albeit at a relatively low price, as the industry there was a cheap 
offshoot of gold mining
113
. The only other Commonwealth route, Australia, was problematic; 
the efforts of the Labour government to obtain uranium bilaterally in 1951 had been rebuffed 
and so production from Australia‟s two mines, Rum Jungle and Radium Hill, was guaranteed, 
for defence purposes, to the CDA until 1960 and 1963 respectively
114
. However, the 
opportunity to procure additional oxide for industrial purposes remained, and so the 
Conservative Cabinet decided in April 1953 to offer „close technical co-operation‟ as 
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incentive for an independent agreement
115
. Churchill, encouraged by Cherwell and Chancellor 
Rab Butler, blamed the American agreements for Britain‟s lacklustre Commonwealth efforts 
and stressed to the Australians that Britain could no longer expect „really useful collaboration‟ 
with America‟116. Churchill now considered much of Britain‟s nuclear knowledge to be 
independently researched, enabling him to distribute industrial information freely, and 
without concern for America, among states offering worthy future partnerships, specifically 
Australia and Canada
117
. 
However, negotiations were rocky, as the Australians did not attach as much 
importance to British innovation as had been hoped; Cherwell‟s visit in October 1953 
originally intended to swap British expertise for large options on local uranium, but succeeded 
only in guaranteeing Britain‟s „preferred customer status‟. The bargaining-chip of technical 
know-how was played down by the Australian Cabinet with Cherwell indignantly reporting 
that the local press and public had „grossly inflated ideas about the value of their uranium 
deposits‟118. Nonetheless, despite the tough attitude of the antipodean negotiators, the 
Paymaster-General argued that „it would still on balance be worthwhile to make an offer of 
full technical assistance‟, demonstrating the degree to which Britain was reliant on its former 
dominion for a secure energy future
119
. 
Dealing with burgeoning Australian nationalism was chastening for the British, who 
rather expected to be greeted graciously by a nation grateful for scientific help. Indeed, the 
unsettling incident, alongside financial commitments, meant that Britain did not feel 
sufficiently confident to opt-out of renewing contracts with the Haut Katanga mine in the 
Belgian Congo the following spring, forcing them back into the American-controlled market 
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which they had sought to escape
120
. Thus, Britain fell back on its CDA stocks until an 
arrangement was finally reached in 1956 to supply uranium from Australia‟s Mary Kathleen 
mine, beginning in 1958 (Figure IV). Nonetheless, the price was relatively high; Britain 
would help Australia build a Harwell-type „DIDO‟ reactor at Lucas Heights near Sydney in 
return for operating reports and concessions on future surplus uranium supplies
121
. The station 
opened in 1958 and represented the logical culmination of Commonwealth co-operation: 
Australian scientists trained at Harwell and British universities would operate a British-
designed Australian-built plant using British-developed fuel rods made from Australian 
(CDA) uranium, with Britain processing the waste
122
. 
 
Mine Proprietor Period 
Ore Milled 
(t) 
U2O3 
(%) 
U2O3 
Production 
(t) 
Client 
Radium Hill 
South Australian 
Government 
1954-62 970,000 0.11-0.15 850 CDA 
Rum Jungle 
Commonwealth 
Funded 
1954-71 863,000 0.28-0.41 3,530 1953-1962 - CDA 
1963-1971 - CS  
Mary Kathleen 
Mary Kathleen 
Uranium Ltd 
1958-63 2,900,000 0.15 4,080 UKAEA 
Moline (Mill 
Only) 
United Uranium 
NL 
1959-64 128,000 0.35-0.68 520 UKAEA 
Rockhole 
South Alligator 
Uranium NL 
1959-62 13,500 1.12 138 UKAEA 
 
Key:     
CDA = Combined Development Agency 
CS = Commonwealth Stockpile 
UKAEA = United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority 
 
Figure IV: Australian Uranium Production, 1954-1971
123
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Figure V: Global Uranium Production, 1945-70
124
 
A further contract was negotiated between the UKAEA and the Canadian El Dorado 
mining company in 1957
125
. However, the global uranium market was volatile; supply chains 
grew in strict connection with military (and a minority of commercial) contracts in a manner 
described by R.F. Pocock as resembling „wildcat prospectors reminiscent of the nineteenth 
century gold rush‟126. When these demands became saturated in the late 1950s, the market 
collapsed, causing serious problems for the British (Figure V). Huge overestimations of 
uranium requirements prompted cancellation of the Anglo-Canadian orders, with the UKAEA 
blaming the slow development of the nuclear programme, improved uranium usage 
efficiency, reduced military needs and disappointing exports
127
. The issue was politically 
sensitive; the Canadians were loath even to „stretch out‟ orders and the Authority was warned 
                                                     
124 OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, Forty Years of Uranium Resources, Production and Demand in Perspective: "The Red 
Book Retrospective." (Paris, 2006), pp. 255-258 
125 R.F. Pocock, Nuclear Power: Its Development in the United Kingdom, pp. 118-119 
126 Ibid., p. 117 
127 Marian Radetzki, Uranium: A Strategic Source of Energy, (London, 1981), pp. 37-39 and NA DO 182/2 „Atomic Energy 
Authority: Annex A:Uranium Stocks Report‟ 3rd November, 1960 
0 
2,000 
4,000 
6,000 
8,000 
10,000 
12,000 
14,000 
16,000 
1
9
4
5
 
1
9
4
7
 
1
9
4
9
 
1
9
5
1
 
1
9
5
3
 
1
9
5
5
 
1
9
5
7
 
1
9
5
9
 
1
9
6
1
 
1
9
6
3
 
1
9
6
5
 
1
9
6
7
 
1
9
6
9
 
U
ra
n
iu
m
 P
ro
d
u
c
ti
o
n
 (
t)
 
Global Uranium Production 
Australia 
Belgian Congo (Zaire) 
Canada 
South Africa 
Soviet Union 
United States 
 38 
 
against damaging Commonwealth relations
128
. Additional South African orders were more 
easily cancelled but the Canadian problems were serious and effectively ended any notion of a 
Commonwealth atomic organisation. Placing this study in its correct context is difficult, as 
little has been written about Britain‟s uranium supply; these negotiations have therefore been 
detailed because they demonstrate an important trend towards the re-definition of the 
Commonwealth. The atomic field highlighted Britain‟s reduced influence over former 
territories, a factor which would subsequently inform Britain‟s response in other quarters, 
notably Europe. 
Nonetheless, despite a mixed Commonwealth reaction towards her atomic power, 
Britain secured the fuel and developed sufficient plant to proceed. The civilian element of 
peaceful atomic power generation, in which Britain was rapidly becoming world leader, has 
often been overshadowed by the perceived main objective of bomb testing. While the 
technical achievement of building atomic weapons during the American blackout was 
certainly „undervalued‟, as Margaret Gowing asserted, the independent spirit it engendered 
also permeated far into the civil field
129
. The McMahon Act had been motivated primarily by 
concerns for sensitive scientific information and critics feared that British security particularly 
lacked the stringency of the US, where all federal scientists underwent loyalty checks
130
. 
Indeed, estimates of the time Klaus Fuchs‟ espionage had saved the Soviets varied from the 
reasonable (two years) to the over-reactionary (ten)
131
. The situation had not improved by the 
mid-fifties, with the USAEC Chairman Admiral Strauss protesting that Britain had failed to 
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improve security as promised
132
. British controls, although not lax, were certainly calmer 
relative to American paranoia during the McCarthy era, where politically-motivated 
censorship claimed its most high-profile scientific victim, Robert Oppenheimer, in 1954. 
Lower security concerns allowed a large international scientific community to develop 
in Britain. Indeed, the futility of controlling foreign influence in the multi-national scientific 
sector was highlighted in an impassioned letter from Rudolf Peierls to Viscount Portal, in 
which he listed numerous ways he himself might be considered a security threat if otherwise 
meaningless personal details were wilfully misinterpreted
133
. The highest stratum of nuclear 
science involved scientists well-acquainted from years of communication and who 
consequently were often friendly (Peierls himself wrote frequently to „Uncle Nick‟- Niels 
Bohr)
134
. However, the ethics of top-level scientists often encouraged them to spread 
scientific information for the global good regardless of politics, causing domestic problems. 
Christopher Hinton, in a frank message to UKAEA Chairman Edwin Plowden, identified a 
fundamental split in the scientific body between scientists like John Cockcroft who wanted to 
„disseminate information as widely as possible‟ in the interests of knowledge, and 
industrialists (like himself) who wished to pragmatically pursue British interests
135
. Cockcroft 
himself gave lectures in Poland and opened discussions on how Britain could assist atomic 
programmes behind the Iron Curtain, an approach supported by Peierls, who championed 
open science‟s potential for building communication with the Soviet bloc, subject to suitable 
safeguards
136
. Thus, in the sense of national identity, men like Cockcroft might more 
reasonably be described as „scientific Britons‟ who enjoyed numerous close global 
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contacts
137
. However, this was not always in the interest of those who wanted to develop civil 
atomic power to increase Britain‟s stock of secret information and thereby her power. 
 
Nonetheless, wider events changed the scene. Prompted by the conclusion of the 
Korean War, in December 1953 President Eisenhower addressed the UN General Assembly 
with „Atoms for Peace‟, a scheme designed to reduce tensions with post-Stalinist Russia and 
re-engage drifting allies
138. The President acknowledged that America‟s atomic monopoly had 
been lost to Soviet proliferation for some time and decided on a policy of rapprochement 
whilst overseeing an unprecedented nuclear weapons build-up. Eisenhower increased US 
stocks twentyfold during his presidency and desperately needed to offset this warlike image in 
Europe; exploring this, John Krige identified an ulterior motivation in „Atoms for Peace‟ as 
propaganda
139
. Britain, as the nation seemingly most seriously engaged with peaceful atomic 
energy, was enrolled by the United States to sanitise her martial image; as Admiral Strauss 
put it, „America would no longer be the sole target of Communist propaganda and irrational 
protests from Nehru and others‟140. Ironically, the technical advances achieved by Britain 
during the years of American atomic isolationism were eventually to prove critical to this re-
evaluation of nuclear strategy; in 1954, Eisenhower oversaw the Atomic Energy Act which, as 
Simon Ball noted, „enabled nuclear cooperation with countries which had made significant 
independent advances in the field of nuclear energy‟141. This was tacitly an acceptance that 
Britain‟s nuclear programme had survived the American blackout and flowered regardless. 
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Indeed, Eisenhower openly lamented the „terrible attitudes‟ within the Truman regime 
towards Britain which stalled American atomic advances
142
. 
However, Britain‟s industrial atomic programme had strengthened her hand, as 
demonstrated by the response of some of its key scientists to the American overtures. 
Christopher Hinton argued forcefully that American information offered under the new 
agreement was of limited worth and that the knowledge of operating Calder Hall given in 
trade was far more valuable. The possibility of so unfair an exchange occurring caused Hinton 
to contact Plowden directly, requesting greater industrial representation on the UKAEA 
Committee in order to influence the government against dispensing information abroad too 
freely
143
. This was the new national identity in action; the emerging sense of international 
openness in the 1950s presented the opportunity for Britain to appreciate American overtures 
but also assert her own position as the atomic decade‟s leading commercial scientific power. 
 
The American position in introducing potentially dangerous technology into the global 
scene was unenviable and „Atoms for Peace‟ was hailed by contemporaries as a genuine 
attempt to defuse the nuclear world. However, further analysis suggests a parallel motivation; 
Britain‟s more liberal approach to atomic knowledge distribution was attracting increasing 
attention from nations wanting to invest in the new technology. Whilst it is implausible that 
„Atoms for Peace‟ was born solely from fear that Britain might corner the market in atomic 
hardware development, the existence of Britain‟s independent reactor programmes, followed 
later by those in Canada and France, merited consideration. Atomic knowledge was clearly 
widespread and so America‟s policy shifted from preserving hegemony to supporting full 
atomic interchange, hoping that promoting civil power would divert foreign expertise and 
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resources from military science. The suggestion to produce an international fissionable 
uranium pool was driven by the knowledge that such material would be difficult to produce 
outside the USA, meaning that any contribution would slow foreign atomic projects 
considerably
144
. Whilst this was aimed firstly at retarding the Russian military programme, it 
was arguably later influenced by the British development of an independent atomic structure 
and the growing appreciation of potential future markets. Thus, Britain‟s atomic field 
exhibited strength in American eyes among weakness elsewhere. 
The multiple facets of „Atoms for Peace‟ have encouraged a lively debate; in addition 
to Krige‟s ideas on propaganda, Joseph Camilleri has offered that the potential foreign market 
for reactors (worth some $30bn.) was lucrative enough to encourage a policy change
145
. 
However, in the context of this study, the notion that Britain‟s atomic progress encouraged 
Eisenhower‟s policy has enjoyed significant support. William Walker contended that the 
American administration, their view clouded by layers of secrecy on both sides, identified that 
civil gains would provide Britain with at least a valuable tool for influencing neighbours 
while the technology potentially offered a second industrial revolution
146
. Whilst this may be 
overstating the case, it remains a reasonable contention that Britain, as the leader of nations 
making independent atomic gains, demonstrated convincingly that American technological 
premiership was threatened. Thus, foreign civil schemes were arguably a notable parallel 
consideration in Atoms for Peace, rather than merely a by-product of a policy designed to 
combat Soviet military proliferation.  
Another aspect of Eisenhower‟s speech was its demand for a scientific conference to 
follow United Nations political meetings in 1955. The Geneva Summit, designed to relieve 
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tension with the Soviet bloc, preceded a scientific discussion marked as the first truly 
international event of its kind since the war. It also illustrated American acceptance of British 
civil leadership: Eisenhower allowed delegates to draft and expand the agenda after lengthy 
consultation with British scientists, notably Cockcroft
147
. Although there was „no surprise in 
the Soviet Display‟, as the Times  reported, the conference nevertheless built bridges with the 
Russians who were no longer seen, as one American general had previously claimed, as a 
„retarded folk‟ dependent on Nazi scientists for trivial progress148. It also enabled the British 
to showcase their new technology to great aplomb; fifty UK companies received enquiries 
from dozens of nations about spreading atomic expertise globally
149
. Such was the demand for 
industrial information that the UKAEA chartered three flights from Geneva to show 100 
foreign scientists (30 of whom came from the Soviet bloc) the Harwell laboratories
150
. It was 
the high summer of atomic optimism; Cockcroft himself enjoyed a little fanciful thinking, 
highlighting the potential of atomic power for such massive projects as draining the swamps 
of Bechuanaland or air-conditioning the Australian outback
151. From a scientist‟s perspective, 
and particularly for men like Cockcroft, Geneva was a paradise. For politicians, it confirmed 
their suspicions: Russia was scientifically in the western slipstream, but nonetheless possessed 
the A-bomb and was just capable of embarking on civil atomic power using domestic 
uranium.  
As a nation self-defining as an atomic pioneer, Britain moved quickly. In ten years she 
had accelerated from begging American help to attaining world premiership in commercial 
atomic power. The 1955 White Paper outlined how the new technology was perceived by 
politicians in relation to Britain‟s international role; it was confidently asserted that „as a 
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leading industrial nation our duty, both to ourselves and other countries, is to establish this 
new industry of nuclear energy on a firm foundation and to develop it with all speed‟152. The 
opening of Britain‟s first civil power station at Calder Hall in October 1956 was a huge event, 
glorified by the Times in a special supplement featuring interviews with all involved
153
. The 
good-feeling manifested itself widely, with Britain keen to demonstrate the benefits of her 
new technology globally. The government agreed to the requests of the UKAEA for greater 
openness and allowed visits from a team of Soviet electrical engineers in March 1956, with 
Khrushchev and Marshal Bulganin following in August
154
. In addition to thawing relations, 
the visits also demonstrated how atomic energy had risen seamlessly into the highest stratum 
of British industry. The engineers were shown the atomic sites of Harwell and Calder Hall 
alongside longstanding conventional power infrastructure; Khrushchev was offered tours of 
the same nuclear installations alongside traditional British powerhouses like Rolls Royce, 
BMC and Clyde shipbuilding
155
. 
It was certainly advantageous for Britain to generate foreign interest; the 1955 White 
Paper urged the rapid development of peaceful atomic power at home and through 
international agencies, hoping that Britain‟s pioneering status would help „fulfil her traditional 
role as an exporter of skill‟156. The increased flexibility of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act had 
produced 40 bilateral contracts between America and other states for research reactors, but 
crucially, Britain had also identified this market as ripe for development until full atomic 
programs were widely economical
157.  Despite being derided as „somewhat primitive‟ by 
notable American physicists, the British Magnox stations were attractive enough to highly-
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industrialised, densely-populated countries suffering post-war energy shortages, most 
obviously in western Europe
158
. The true effect of British nuclear independence was the 
transatlantic reaction; abundant fossil fuel stocks made civil atomic reactor development in 
the USA uneconomical but American physicists nonetheless began to advocate developing an 
atomic programme „beyond domestic needs‟ for export purposes159. Britain had led the 
demonstration that there was „no such thing as a monopoly on the laws of nature‟ and was 
preparing to assist interested parties in launching their own atomic programmes
160
. Thus, 
„Atoms for Peace‟, as an ideological shift-change in American thought, was not motivated 
solely by the need for international atomic security but the concern not to forfeit her potential 
commercial atomic advantage. 
The development of civil atomic power in Britain proceeded well for the remainder of the 
nineteen-fifties and the second „PIPPA‟ reactor was opened at Chapelcross in 1959, albeit it to less 
fanfare (a 40-word summary was all The Times deemed worthy)
161
. Two further plants were 
completed in 1962, although now the Central Electricity Authority (CEA, later the CEGB) offered 
commercial contracts to private companies under UKAEA supervision
162
. However, the saturation of 
military plutonium requirements described earlier ensured that these Magnox plants were intended 
primarily for civil power generation, making the future of atomic power in Britain a mainly 
commercial exercise
163
. One of the first tests of Britain‟s new scientific identity came around 1958, 
when it emerged that further research and development was required to improve atomic power‟s 
competitiveness. Britain‟s limited technical manpower was stretched too thin, forcing the UKAEA to 
streamline research into the most promising categories (Figure VI). Importantly, the private 
construction consortia also lacked skilled engineers and were occupied almost exclusively 
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constructing the already-obsolete Magnox stations in Britain, meaning, as R.F. Pocock noted, that no 
reactor system was developed for its export potential alone
164
. Here, the British organisation stalled 
them; the UKAEA could not transfer government funds to private companies directly and had no remit 
to develop export potential. Its only contribution, therefore, was to provide intellectual assistance and 
lobby government to help industrial exports
165
. This hamstrung scientists working to promote 
international co-operation, with Cockcroft being forced to assist Norwegian reactor programmes to 
raise European financial assistance for his new helium-cooled research plant at Winfrith
166
. Thus, 
Britain‟s atomic development capacity reached its limits almost purely on domestic requirements, 
leaving little scope for extensive exporting and reducing the technology‟s potential as a foreign policy 
instrument. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure VI: UKAEA Research, 1962
167
 
An independent British nuclear programme to satisfy even domestic demand also did 
not fit into the wider American plan for post-war Europe. Timothy Mitchell has accused the 
American administration of deliberately undermining the traditionally strong coal lobbies in 
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Europe by transferring the continents energy dependence to Middle-Eastern oil which had to 
be negotiated through dollars
168
. This assertion has been expanded by David Painter, who 
demonstrated how oil, with American backing, became the single greatest Marshall Plan 
purchase
169
. As a declining global power, Britain‟s dependence on oil from the Middle East, 
an area demonstrating increasingly nationalistic anti-imperial tendencies, was a less attractive 
proposition than most. The events of the Anglo-Iranian Oil controversy and Suez Crisis 
proved that oil in a great power context was undesirable, whilst the traditional support of 
„King Coal‟ (described in Chapter II) was under severe pressure170. Atomic power was a 
logical escape to this conundrum, representing an opportunity for Britain to remain 
independent of wider energy commitments and sit more easily at the centre of her „three 
circles‟. Developing nuclear capacity, as a reaction to the confluence of European energy 
constraints and her self-envisaged global role, reclaimed much autonomy and influence in the 
energy field for the UK, giving her a new position based on scientific and technical expertise. 
As the UKAEA‟s economists concluded happily: „the civil reactor programme has done its 
job by showing coal miners and sheikhs that there is strong competition not far above the 
present price range for coal and oil‟171. 
 
Although Britain had successfully negotiated a more tolerable civil atomic 
understanding, it remained to settle the Anglo-American military relationship. Harold 
Macmillan, furthering as Prime Minister the beliefs he fostered as defence minister, pushed 
Britain‟s nuclear programme onwards to acquire the hydrogen bomb172. As one commentator 
put it, pursuing the H-Bomb amounted to a choice of whether Britain would return „toward 
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the status of the superpowers, or toward that of Sweden and Switzerland‟173. Continued 
pressure from British politicians and militarists to see Britain as integral to, rather than a 
forward base of, America‟s European nuclear defence wall eventually encouraged the 
resumption of Anglo-American information-sharing relations in the late 1950s, exemplified 
by the two bilateral agreements of 1958-9 resuming nuclear technology transfer
 174
. Again, 
Britain‟s new assertiveness in the atomic energy sector was demonstrated; Macmillan co-
operated happily on weapons matters in which America was obviously pre-eminent but 
insisted that the treaty omit any references to sharing civil atomic power, a preamble to which 
effect had been attempted by Congress in their repeal of the McMahon Act
175
. On a political 
level, Britain regarded civil atomic power as her area of hegemony, and was reasonably 
justified; the Americans acquiesced and the offending paragraph was removed
176
. The path, as 
John Baylis asserted, was now clear for „an Anglo-American nuclear partnership that 
remained in force throughout the Cold War period‟ and finally buried the bad-feeling of the 
late nineteen-forties
177
. 
 
To summarise, the period described in this chapter was arguably the most fundamental 
to the evolving British outlook on atomic energy. Politically, Britain envisaged itself as the 
central hub of the Commonwealth; the most advanced nation seeking to promote civil atomic 
energy as a magnanimous gesture for global development
178
. She expected to export talent 
and in return receive raw materials necessary for her research programmes. However, the 
initial difficult negotiations produced a new definition of the Commonwealth as „common‟ 
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and not merely the old Empire wearing different clothes. Notions of Britain generously 
helping erstwhile colonies get on their atomic feet were soon disabused as the emphasis 
shifted to mutual assistance. 
The years of American withdrawal produced political barriers increasingly at odds 
with the reality of growing atomic capability across the Iron Curtain, an action which in itself 
shaped a distinctly British national position. The scientific body which had accumulated in 
Britain was at the forefront of this, consisting of a pool of relatively international talent torn to 
varying degrees between atomic power as a matter of national prestige or its uses for 
international benefit. The offers to share scientific knowledge with interested parties went 
some way to identifying future European partners, thawing relations in Moscow and 
provoking an American response; „Atoms for Peace‟ was forced by the dual realisation that 
the McMahon Act had contained neither the Soviet military nuclear programme nor Britain‟s 
potential commercial challenge. Encouraged by the progressive loosening of American 
legislation caused by independent acquisition of nuclear then hydrogen bombs, Britain grew 
increasingly confident, demanding a more equal relationship. Her commercial advances 
certainly provoked their own reaction; America promoted civil power as propaganda to cover 
military build-up and accelerate her civil research.  Thus, this study has demonstrated how 
Britain‟s civil power was a more important factor in changing American attitudes than much 
current historiography allows. This effect was so strong that it finally achieved the previously 
most intractable „fission‟, the separation of atomic energy into distinct military and civil 
categories. 
Yet it was this latter application that slowed Britain‟s rise. There was no immediate 
appreciable Commonwealth market for atomic power; although India presented strong 
consumer potential, short-term interest was probable only in highly-industrialised areas which 
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were also under energy stress. However, the early stages of European atomic programmes 
were also viewed hungrily from across the Atlantic and so Britain entered the late nineteen-
fifties with a prestigious position that it was not completely capable of sustaining. In any case, 
by the end of the decade much of the earlier hope for international cooperation had descended 
into a web of bilateral agreements; in 1959 the director of the IAEA labelled the USA the 
organisation‟s „Achilles Heel‟ for repeatedly bypassing its authority in this manner. Britain 
and the USSR were also culpable, with a dozen such arrangements each
179
. The commercial 
flowering of civil atomic energy superseded the earlier military paranoia, with Britain 
developing the world‟s largest domestic atomic energy network and obtaining obvious 
economic advantages over its continental neighbours, which now offered a lucrative 
technological market. However, concerns over export capacity and political unwillingness to 
integrate, or even interfere with, a continent undergoing severe political fluctuations informed 
the role of atomic power in Britain‟s national position. The successes and failures of atomic 
Britain in post-war Europe shall be examined in the next chapter. 
  
                                                     
179 Helen C. Allison, „News Roundup‟, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January, 1959, p. 47 
 51 
 
CHAPTER FOUR: EUROPE 
 
The next diplomatic challenge was presented by Britain‟s neighbours. In the broader 
context, the European political theatre, traditionally relegated behind imperial expansion, now 
presented an opportunity. As Tony Judt asserted; „America might be the indispensable ally, 
but it could hardly furnish the British with a renewed sense of purpose, much less an updated 
national identity... where else but to Europe could Great Britain now look to recover its 
international standing?‟180. The arrival of atomic technology coincided with the building of 
„New Europe‟, and finding a place for such science on a continent undergoing severe political 
change proved challenging. Atomic weapons had already proved too much to act on 
internationally; Labour had lost Britain‟s veto on American nuclear bombs and the failure of 
the European Defence Community in 1954 demonstrated the limits of continental military 
integration. The acquisition of atomic arsenals was too vital an interest to contain; all great 
powers (real and perceived) coveted them, if only to ensure national security. Digesting the 
1955 Geneva Conference, Harold Macmillan, Britain‟s Chancellor, described how nuclear 
weapons were now vital for preventing conflict and expressed confusion at disarmament 
lobbies encouraging a return to „respectable war‟ with mass armies and huge casualties181. 
This paradox ensured that the future of atomic co-operation in Europe would, initially at least, 
involve only peaceful applications, although by the mid-fifties it was dubious that Europe 
could agree on even this issue. The young French nuclear programmes did not immediately 
consider a continental project, instead seeing independent Britain as the obvious benchmark 
for competition
182
. Indeed, the negotiations surrounding a unified European atomic energy 
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community, and the attendant proposal to pool know-how were initially treated by some 
French sectors as dangerously assisting Germany, a „Kollaboration‟ for the nineteen fifties, as 
George Beaulieu dubbed it
183
.  
 
The British position was more precarious; she was preoccupied with maintaining the 
independence that had consumed so much effort and would decline any European venture 
prejudicial to Commonwealth links. Indeed, atomic power was a policy area in which 
Commonwealth support was more important than most, given the previously-mentioned 
issues of uranium supplies and scientific exchanges. Later, concerns about retaining friendly 
military information-sharing relations with America also discouraged integration, as it was 
feared the USAEC would dislike British atomic co-operation with supranational European 
organisations
184
. Thus, the interests of the atomic energy lobby conformed to political euro-
scepticism during the initial discussions on European integration during Anthony Eden‟s 
premiership. For these reasons, among others, British delegates did not engage seriously with 
strong European integration in the mid-fifties, sending only observers to the 1955 Messina 
Conference
185
. In British eyes, any action would have to come through the OEEC, a looser 
organisation formed in 1948 to promote individual European economies
186
. This lukewarm 
response caused consternation in Washington, where the British Ambassador was forced to 
defend the government position, criticising the „air of unreality‟ regarding France‟s 
willingness to integrate and highlighting Britain‟s own commitment to Commonwealth 
association and reducing tariffs (conforming with GATT) as grounds for declining 
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Messina
187
. British requests to keep-in-step regarding atomic policy antagonised the US State 
Department, where the view prevailed that the supranational approach to atomic energy and 
economic integration was superior to OEEC efforts. In a friendly letter of December 1955, 
Dulles tried to persuade Macmillan to engage more decisively with Europe, hoping that the 
Foreign Secretary would follow American lines and not cause a „conflict of advice‟ with the 
Six
188
. In the atomic field, at least, this went unheeded; the European Communities sent three 
delegates, the „Wise Men‟, to Britain in 1956 to see how the new technology could address 
their growing energy needs. However, Britain‟s willingness to co-operate was strictly defined 
as scientific, not political; the Foreign Office granted permission for the visit on the 
assumption that the Europeans were interested in „technical substance‟ and did not arrive as 
„evangelists for the Euratom approach‟189. 
 
To an extent the reticence of Eden and Macmillan was prudent; the new European 
project had ambiguous aims and infighting regarding the atomic community began almost 
immediately. The famous „Spaak Report‟ of April 1956 recommended establishing common 
research centres and supported Jean Monnet‟s earlier appeal to limit European atomic 
development to peaceful uses
190
. However, by January 1957, Spaak was in London 
complaining of West Germany‟s placation of the French Right by allowing France to 
maintain nuclear weapons within the previously exclusively-civil Euratom Treaty
191
. The 
resulting political uncertainty in Westminster was matched by scientists in British institutions. 
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As the physicist George Thomson noted, there was little reason for Britain to join Euratom as 
there was no advantage in negotiating her uranium contracts through the organisation and 
little scope for industrial collaboration except a few specialist projects (such as a large-isotope 
separation plant) which even then might be obtained unilaterally
192
.  
Nonetheless, the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) came into being in 
March 1957, and Christian Deubner has made the valuable assertion that the Community, as 
an area within which the French could develop their nuclear program without American 
interference, was vital in overcoming the initial reluctance of Paris to integrate into a wider 
common market
193
. Regarding the British national position, the „Wise Men Report‟ outlined 
roughly the state of atomic international relations at the founding of the European atomic 
community; Britain‟s concentration on commercial Magnox stations suggested a short-term 
benefit to Euratom of technical assistance in the manner offered by Macmillan, but as these 
reactor types were already obsolescent by the late nineteen-fifties, the most lucrative 
partnerships would clearly lie elsewhere. The United States, with no domestic civil atomic 
market, could use Europe as a breeding-ground to train scientists and investigate the long-
term atomic projects which it itself might need in the medium term
194
. However, even in this 
relatively clear view the weakness of Euratom was visible. The „divorce between institutions 
and programs‟, as Henry Nau labelled it, meant that this report was not submitted until two 
months after the Euratom treaty was signed, highlighting how the European atomic program 
was swept along by wider political concerns
195
. John Krige concurred, contending that the 
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underwhelming impact of Euratom has been evidenced precisely by a shortage of analytical 
scholarship
196
. 
Despite the assertions of the „Wise Men‟, British scientific institutions still regarded 
themselves as pioneers with everything to lose through integration. In a long memorandum to 
Macmillan on the 16
th
 July 1957, Edwin Plowden railed against British entry into Euratom, 
claiming that as the organisation would not build reactors directly, the opportunity remained 
for Britain to access European markets. However, staff shortages at the UKAEA forced its 
chairman to demand a policy limited to basic information sharing, co-ordination of small joint 
projects and staff exchanges, allowing Britain to preserve its leadership and benefit from 
further co-operation despite her limited capacity
197
. However, political pressure on the Prime 
Minister was building; the Board of Trade sent a memorandum the following day 
complaining about the UKAEA‟s inaction regarding Europe and warned that Euratom could 
quickly become a commercial threat
198. Macmillan responded to the „great difficulties‟ of 
direct Euratom membership by pursuing a compromise of indirect participation, involving 
„bilateral agreements, membership of the European Nuclear Energy Agency (ENEA), and the 
European Council for Nuclear Research‟199. The ENEA, established in February 1958, was a 
looser organisation inside the OEEC with a narrow technical basis to develop atomic energy, 
unlike Euratom with its overtones of political union through economic integration
200
. The 
preferred business method for Britain was through projects like DRAGON, the high-
temperature gas-cooled experimental reactor funded by contributions of 43.4% each from the 
UKAEA and Euratom, with the remainder paid by other European national atomic 
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institutes
201
. This stance was important as it demonstrated British position clearly; she would 
agree to technical co-operation designed to improve her research but would not yet risk losing 
her atomic prowess. Thus, the ENEA approach was not quite, as Henry Nau has contended, 
designed to rival and disadvantage Euratom but was significantly inspired by the practicalities 
of research and manpower to preserve British hegemony with limited resources
202
. 
 
However, the Foreign Office were nervous that too much reluctance in dealing 
seriously with Euratom would result in the Community becoming more accustomed to 
American methods and techniques, especially after the joint Euratom-US Agreement of 
November 1958 agreed to raise 1GW of European atomic capacity within seven years using 
American-designed reactors
203
. The UKAEA was encouraged to interact with Euratom 
members, if only to provide a forum for scientific and engineering exchange
204
. The result, a 
Euratom-UKAEA agreement in December, showed the limits that scientists at British national 
institutions were prepared to accept. The Authority agreed to the exchange of declassified 
scientific information, staff exchanges and to supply and reprocess nuclear fuel to operate 
British-built reactors with options to supply the same for other installations on a case-by-case 
basis
205
. As Jonathan Helmreich has demonstrated, by refusing to participate fully in the 
American scheme for European integration, Britain created the opportunity for more direct 
transatlantic involvement on the continent as Eisenhower sought to build a Soviet-resistant 
Europe atomic community containing markets for American reactors
206
. The irony was that, 
for much of the mid-fifties, atomic energy seemed possibly the only field ripe for further 
                                                     
201 NA AB 32/96 „OEEC High Temperature Reactor Project DRAGON, First Annual Report: 1959-60‟, p. 190 
202 Henry Nau, National Politics and International Technology, pp. 186-9 
203 „United States Euratom Agreement‟, Nature, 6th December, 1958, p. 1551  
204 NA FO 371/140574 „Memorandum from Geoffrey Kirk, British Embassy in the Netherlands to M.C. Hainworth, Foreign 
Office‟, 10th April, 1959 
205 NA PREM 11/2838 „Agreement between the Government of the UK and Euratom for Co-Operation in the Peaceful Uses 
of Atomic Energy‟ 17th December 1958 
206 Jonathan Helmreich, „The United States and the Formation of EURATOM‟, pp. 389-90, 395-66 
 57 
 
European integration and thus an opportunity for true leadership was spurned by the 
British
207
. Displaying customary foresight, John Cockcroft lamented the „masterly inactivity‟ 
shown to Europe, demonstrating further the splits that remained between national institutions 
and elements in the highest echelons of British science
208
. 
 
Britain‟s lukewarm response was received as prevarication in Europe, with some 
elements of the German press reporting that Macmillan desired an anti-EEC counter-
alliance
209
. This was partially true; Britain‟s favoured economic model was the European Free 
Trade Area (EFTA), an economic agreement signed in 1960 to reduce trade fees between 
members without establishing common external tariffs
210
. However, the issue was prejudiced 
further by Britain‟s stance on military nuclear power. Selwyn Lloyd, the Foreign Minister 
summarised it thus: „the fact that we, alone of the Western European Powers, have made the 
hydrogen bomb, joined the American nuclear directorate and are now seeking to prevent any 
"fourth country" from possessing it, implies to many Europeans, especially the French, that 
we are seeking to establish and maintain a two-level Power system in the free world, with 
Britain and America in command and the rest in the ranks‟211. The „Six plus Seven‟ model, 
based on an integrated core of six EC members surrounded by „free‟ EFTA participants was 
highly significant and the British role in dividing Western Europe into a Free Trade Area and 
a Community became the cornerstone of the debate on future European diplomacy. 
Restoring relations with the „Six‟ became important, not least because by the early 
sixties it emerged that Britain‟s Magnox construction had been too sluggish, once again 
raising the issue of external markets. The „official‟ view was that Britain could export easily, 
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but industrialists feared that heavy subsidies on American reactors would make any 
competition impossible
212 . The scientists at Harwell considered research to be Britain‟s 
strongest card; John Cockcroft highlighted that although Britain could not offer financial 
assistance to Euratom in the same manner as the United States, her research and development 
could be made available on a „reasonable economic basis‟213. The construction of the atomic 
power plant in Latina, Italy was suggested as the blueprint for future interaction; the 
installation would be designed in Britain but built by Italian industry under British 
supervision using special components and fuel cycles managed by the UKAEA
214
.  
However, the compromise was insufficient, and the proposals of the Hallstein 
Commission to accelerate the Treaty of Rome from June 1960 caused concern in London. In a 
letter to the Times, Conservative MP Peter Kirk argued that Britain had alternatives to the 
looming choice of economic war or accepting damaged trade. Arguing for a signal to reassure 
the Six, Kirk proposed that Britain join the ECSC and Euratom, in the case of the latter 
criticising the traditional rationale that membership would cost Britain more than she would 
gain. „I doubt if that was ever true‟, Kirk claimed, „and even if it is true now, it would 
certainly not be true in 10 or 15 years‟ time‟215. Taking up this viewpoint Selwyn Lloyd urged 
Macmillan to utilise Euratom to negotiate with the Six, even at the expense of EFTA
216
. The 
move was still economically pertinent; „Euratom needs the British knowledge and Britain 
needs the market for her nuclear energy industry‟ one journal claimed 217 . Macmillan 
concurred and instructed the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, John Profumo, to announce 
Britain‟s intention to consider Euratom and ECSC membership at the Western European 
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Union Assembly in Paris in June
218
. The gambit was well-balanced; Britain would apply if the 
Six would let her „find her way through the technicalities to realities‟ and avoid full 
integration
219
. However it soon emerged that Euratom membership would rest on the larger 
objective of EEC participation. West Germany particularly would only contemplate further 
integration and would not accept British involvement in the two „lesser‟ organisations when 
the Common Market was becoming increasingly influential
220
.  
 
Although unsuccessful, the attempt demonstrated the faith set by British politicians in 
their nation‟s atomic prowess; it was a card they believed sufficiently powerful that the „Six‟ 
would tolerate an awkward arrangement with a semi-integrated Britain to accommodate it. 
Significantly, it also represented the changing attitude towards atomic politics in Westminster. 
The work of the Attlee and second Churchill governments, so desperate to attain nuclear 
independence for both military and commercial reasons, would now be offered as a sacrifice 
to wider political goals. As Miriam Camps highlighted, this phenomenon was representative 
of wider changes in British policy during the early sixties. Previously, commitment to Europe 
was viewed as binary; the common market was incompatible with Commonwealth ties, so 
Britain must „choose‟ between Europe and the old Empire. However, once negotiation with 
the Six began, the tone shifted and it was asserted that engaging with Europe was now 
possible without damaging free trade ambitions
221
. The negotiations surrounding Euratom 
membership were at the forefront of these attempts to find a „halfway house‟ but it was 
precisely this tightrope-walking which irritated the continentals, who, despite initial 
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friendliness, rapidly lost patience. Britain‟s atomic card was played too late, quickly losing 
value against wider continental political concerns.   
 
 Thus, Britain entered the nineteen-sixties in a peculiar situation, with her national 
confidence in its civil atomic sense arguably at its most vulnerable since the war. Atomic 
prowess was now a negotiable commodity to be utilised politically and to this end a UKAEA 
steering committee was established under William Penney to review monthly the prospect of 
joining Euratom „as part of the process of joining the Common Market’222. Penney was the 
senior scientist and pre-eminent national figure, being the only member of the group with a 
knighthood. His position as part of the weapons division was also instructive; Britain‟s most 
crucial atomic interest would be well-protected by his stewardship. Generally, the response 
was negative; supranational organisations like Euratom were still alien to the British, 
particularly those UKAEA scientists who were bewildered by the nature of research and 
development in the Community. France and Germany seemed not to gain much from their 
investments, whereas Italy was „doing handsomely‟223. The position of Britain in such an 
organisation was unclear and making a safe return on her research expenditure was not 
guaranteed. Another problem was demarcating what could safely be exchanged; weapons 
technology was off-limits and the British guarded their work on fast reactors extremely 
jealously
224. Finally, one of Britain‟s strongest cards was its staff, who possessed far greater 
industrial experience than their European counterparts
225
. Nonetheless, this advantage had to 
be played carefully; Euratom offered better pay and conditions to almost all staff categories 
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and so the UKAEA recommended that, instead of handing over British sites, the two agencies 
proceed by „contract of association‟ to avoid any significant brain-drain226. 
 
The scepticism of Britain‟s scientific institutions was often legitimate; Christian 
Deubner criticised Euratom as a „stillborn‟ integration scheme which lacked mettle in 
allowing independent bilateral agreements and uranium contracts, hamstringing the cohesive 
„European nuclear industry‟ that Cockcroft hoped Britain could assist227. This was partially 
true; many Euratom members, notably Italy and the Netherlands, negotiated directly with 
Britain to facilitate their civil atomic programs, infuriating the Community
228
. Nonetheless, 
contemporary commentators noted that Britain‟s atomic lead was valuable as a card best 
played in a measured fashion with the ultimate objective of integration. Kenneth Cohen, for 
example, criticised Britain‟s stand-offish compromise of lending technicians to Europe as this 
merely weakened Britain‟s domestic industry whilst doing nothing concrete to convince the 
Six of British methods
229 . In Cohen‟s view, American support made the rise of Europe 
inevitable; the only issue was when to climb in. The European scene changed quickly in the 
late fifties, and Britain was economically slow to react, leading Alan Milward to criticise the 
British system of import controls and free-trade area negotiations as a „nineteenth-century 
solution to a twentieth-century problem‟230. Ultimately, Britain did apply for EEC, and by 
extension, Euratom membership in July 1961, although the negotiating process became 
arduous. This was partly Macmillan‟s fault; his reactions to diplomatic and economic realities 
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were slow to the extent that he was accused of „backing into Europe‟ 231 . This attitude 
motivated neither the Germans nor the French, who, also suspicious of American influence in 
the UK, vetoed the British application in 1963. 
 
In conclusion, Britain‟s atomic relationships with continental Europe were often 
conspicuous in the way they contradicted prevalent political trends. During the period of 
British political disinterest around Messina, nuclear energy was increasingly mooted as an 
area of possible interaction, whereas by the time Britain did attempt to integrate fully with 
Europe, the domestic atomic lobby protested it. This was symptomatic of the atomic 
community‟s relative stability throughout the period in comparison to the „swing‟ witnessed 
in wider politics and economics; the UKAEA always recommended a safe distance from 
Europe using personnel exchanges and design discussions whilst remaining sovereign. 
Initially progressive, this policy soon became retrograde to Macmillan‟s vision for Britain in 
Europe as the Prime Minister slowly warmed to approaching the Six.  However, Euratom was 
initially weak and far from a united front; even those committed to the Six hedged their bets 
and opened negotiations with Britain for information. Relative to Britain, the Community was 
of little initial interest, being essentially an expansion of the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) to cover new energy markets, none of which represented lifeline 
interests. France wanted German coal and peaceful atomic energy, Britain already had civil 
atomic power in development and sufficient, if plateauing, coal production. The independent 
atomic gains were a source of pride to many prominent British figures, both inside and 
outside scientific institutions; „Britain had lifted itself by its own boot-straps into a peacetime 
atomic power at a great sacrifice of hospitals, schools, retooling of industry, etc.‟ wrote one 
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commentator, „and here were the Europeans trying to jump on the bandwagon‟232. On a wider 
scale, this was acknowledged; British politicians eschewed supranational energy control 
bodies, preferring looser OEEC co-operation. 
When Britain did engage with Euratom, it was merely to ensure that her trading 
agreements concerning uranium and technology sales would continue unchanged, preventing 
a monopolisation of the buyer‟s market by the Six and a consequent price slump233. 
Macmillan appreciated the value of a large market for British reactor technology and signed a 
second agreement with „The Six‟ in February 1959, although it was anticipated that exports 
could not be greatly increased as the rapid acceleration proposed by the 1957 amendment of 
the 1955 White Paper would tie all British engineering and technical expertise to domestic 
construction
234
. Nonetheless, wider concerns overtook atomic considerations. The 
Commonwealth, although a sizeable factor in civil atomic spheres, was declining in economic 
and political importance and adherence to old colonies seemed increasingly outdated during 
the „Winds of Change‟ era235. Factions with foreign policy experience within the Conservative 
government wondered whether Britain could still manoeuvre into a partially-integrated state, 
although this demand for a „special place‟ for the UK was not appreciated by the Six, who 
went ahead with their fast-integration schemes. Anne Deighton and Piers Ludlow identified 
how the negotiation process was ludicrously overcomplicated from the outset; Macmillan 
presented the application as a commencement of negotiations, leading to endless rounds of 
discussion over each new development with EFTA, the Commonwealth and Parliament. 
Furthermore, the fragmented nature of the Six meant responses were sometimes equally 
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slow
236
. In a specifically atomic context, one must add to this inertia the reluctance of British 
scientists in the civil atomic authorities who were asked throughout 1962 what they thought 
about accession into Euratom, and replied repeatedly „No‟. The final straw was the issue of 
atomic weapons; Macmillan considered „offering Britain‟s bomb to Europe in return for a 
sound economic tie-up‟ but French concerns for nuclear self-sufficiency scuppered the 
idea
237
. 
Slow progress in Europe called for concessions and civil atomic power was mooted as 
a field for potential compromise. Critics accused Macmillan of sacrificing Britain‟s atomic 
prowess on the altar of political integration, but wider concerns halted the plan. The French 
veto broke Macmillan‟s government and the Conservatives at large, bringing to the fore the 
first Labour government in thirteen years and Harold Wilson, who promised the return of the 
„white heat of industry‟. By the time Britain did join Euratom as a component of EC 
membership in 1973, the benefits of atomic union had dwindled significantly and nuclear 
integration became a by-product of, rather than the driving force behind, what was by then a 
much more important economic alliance
238
. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: SOCIETY 
 
The final area of atomic power requiring analysis is the social perception of nuclear 
energy and how it responded to differing national and local agendas, in turn prompting 
investigation of how these changes influenced future priorities. The development of atomic 
weapons had placed Western leaders in a predicament concerning the image of new 
technology; Eisenhower was partly influenced by the awful public image of hydrogen bombs 
to promote his „Atoms for Peace‟ program in Europe239. The British reception of atomic 
power was friendlier; she had never used bombs in anger and many agreed that atomic force 
was key for defence, never mind great power status. Her separate achievements in civil power 
also provided moral distance from aggressive weapons stockpiling in the United States. This 
independent attitude permeated into the public sphere, as demonstrated by a September 1955 
survey, in which almost twice as many respondents asserted that they preferred budget cuts on 
military nuclear ventures (32%) than the nascent civilian programme (17%)
240
. This result 
was remarkable not only for the difference of opinion but also in demonstrating a public 
consciousness and understanding of the two distinct uses of nuclear fission. The impact on the 
news world was similar, with the Times identifying Calder Hall as a prestige project worthy of 
a twelve-page supplement. Private engineering firms certainly agreed, as identified by the 
clamour for advertising space surrounding the news of the plant and the glory of being 
associated with the pioneering work at the world‟s first „commercial‟ power station241.  
The most important impact of atomic power was the interaction between layers of 
decision-making in British government. National government was certainly mainly pro-
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nuclear and the nineteen-fifties were a period when „nuclear industry basked in the sunlight of 
public approval and political patronage‟242. The White Papers of 1955 and 1957 assumed that 
it would be relatively simple to find space in Britain for atomic installations, a view that was 
later expanded. At a Cabinet meeting in 1957, the Minister of Power swept aside local 
concerns, arguing that „it should be made clear, at the very outset of the new programme, that 
some loss of amenities was the unavoidable price which had to be paid if the needs of the 
economy over the next fifteen years were to be met‟. The most the government could offer 
was a „revised procedure‟ for obtaining planning permission which it hoped would be enough 
to allay rural fears
243
. 
At local authority level, atomic plants were often popular as councils vied to have their 
constituencies represented at the forefront of new science and industry. Construction of the 
experimental fast reactor at Dounreay was actively solicited by local MP Sir David Robertson 
in the hope of reducing chronic unemployment and providing skilled opportunities in northern 
Scotland
244
. As pieces of human geography, the new nuclear stations were often accepted into 
the local area as points of interest. For example, when Trawsfynydd station was under 
construction the local councils followed the industrialists‟ argument that atomic stations and 
nature could be complementary and that „it was possible that people who came to see the 
power station might stay in the national park to enjoy the natural beauties‟245. 
The impact on local identity in the Lake District was even more profound; „West Cumberland 
Leads the World‟ was the view of the regional paper on the opening of Calder Hall246. The 
following year, the local development council released a brochure depicting the Marchon 
chemical works set against Cumberland countryside (Figure VII). This was the new scientific 
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identity in a nutshell; hyper-modern industry in a traditional Lakeland setting. Even after the 
1957 Windscale fire the local authority stated that it trusted the UKAEA „to do everything in 
the best interest of people and the nation‟247. 
 
 
Figure VII: 'Cumberland Faces the Future', Local Development Brochure, 1957
248
 
Used with Permission of Whitehaven Public Record Office and Local Studies Library 
 
The large degree of state intervention in the early atomic program, according to Dave 
Elliott, gave Britain „at least the appearance of preventing the worst excesses of uncontrolled 
competition‟249. However his argument that, owing to remote coastal locations (an 
engineering necessity) for atomic stations, there were relatively few siting arguments has been 
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disputed. No nuclear power station was ever blocked by a local planning protest, but 
objections were often numerous and vociferous
250
. Between 1956 and 1961 the first seven 
proposed plants received over 500 individual objections, not counting thousands of petition 
signatures
251
. Analysing this data, Elizabeth Rough contended, importantly, that public 
opposition was not merely „NIMBYism‟ as previously suggested, but rested instead on 
developed safety worries
252. Rough‟s argument that „public concern-whilst largely absent at 
the national level-was certainly present amongst the communities faced with hosting nuclear 
facilities‟ is logical, especially when one considers how unrealistic it would be for a public 
expected to understand atomic weapons as a tool of great destruction to not also fear the 
dangers of peaceful applications. Thus, despite the protestations of industrialists, it is untrue 
that most local opposition was confined to farmers concerned for cattle or ramblers 
complaining about views being spoilt by atomic chimneys,
253
. 
 
The first real tests of the new technology‟s credibility were its initial mishaps, notably 
the Windscale fire of 1957 which led to the first sizeable outcry against atomic power. 
Arguably influenced by his background as a nuclear engineer, Rowland Pocock described the 
Windscale „disaster‟ as merely a „non-event‟ which only served to highlight the safety of 
atomic stations simply by being Britain‟s worst contemporary nuclear mishap. In addition, he 
contended that much of the general social concern surrounding nuclear power was due to 
overzealous government secrecy and a lack of public relations skill in informing local 
citizens
254
. The top-level response was certainly confused; the national government insisted 
that the public should not fear civil stations because of detailed engineering differences 
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between Calder Hall and Windscale, the significance of which the public cannot be expected 
to have understood
255
. A session in the Lords six weeks after the accident illustrated the 
situation well; many peers felt that the event risked turning the public against atomic power 
despite its lack of casualties or damaging effects. Indeed, Lord Rea implored the Minister of 
Power to „take the public a little more into his confidence‟ and release more information about 
the risks of civil stations and possible accidents. However, the reply was fractious; although 
he conceded that liaisons with the public were inadequate, the Minister retorted that Britain 
would not change its plans for atomic power, insisting that repetition was impossible
256
. 
 
The extent to which opposition to military atomic power spilled over into protest 
about peaceful uses is also debateable. Dominic Sandbrook has argued that, despite early 
successes, CND was never an effective political force in Britain because of her declining 
influence in relation to America. Any notable opposition to military nuclear power, therefore, 
was merely a concern of „upper middle-class dissenters and student bohemians‟ and a matter 
of disinterest for the working-class bulk of Britain
257
. With anger at plutonium plants 
struggling even to register effectively, opposition to the more palatable uses of civil atomic 
power was rare. However, this view, while plausible, does not take account of the traditional 
criticism of nuclear power that its military origins in Britain led to layers of secrecy which 
public perception could not penetrate
258
. For this reason, and taking into account the evidence 
that civil nuclear power was a concerning issue at least for the local population, Sandbrook‟s 
view is possibly better placed as a general national statement. In any case, opposition to civil 
atomic power was initially too disparate to register effectively, consisting of communities in 
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the immediate area and diffuse social elements at national level with whom they had little 
contact.  
 
In addition to public perceptions, the attitude of the media is also worth noting. A 
notable statistical approach was undertaken by Martin Bauer, who argued that journalistic 
disposition towards science reporting, among which nuclear power was preponderant in the 
1950s, began with (perhaps inevitable) negativity in the aftermath of Hiroshima before 
recovering a mainly positive light as Britain entered the nuclear age
259
. In agreement with 
Sandbrook, Bauer‟s study found that public mobilisation through the media began with an 
intense period during the 1950s, as British society was expected to appreciate new 
developments through „celebratory propaganda‟260. The perception of atomic power in the 
media was certainly initially positive during the early civil phases; in addition to support from 
local newspapers, the national press often backed the new technology. Indeed, The Times, 
having greeted atomic power with such fanfare, remained charitable even after the Windscale 
disaster, blaming the accident on the UKAEA‟s unfortunate mandate of developing an 
„exciting field of technology‟ with a chronic shortage of manpower261. The left-wing media 
was also sympathetic, with the Manchester Guardian imploring the government to curtail 
other ambitious projects and support atomic power
262
. Although by no means a 
comprehensive overview, comparing these reactions shows how much of the media were 
initially friendly to civil atomic power and actively supported it on their pages. Indeed, a sign 
of how far the technology had permeated British national identity came from Sir Christopher 
Hinton, who rejected both the post-Windscale uproar and the political findings of the cause of 
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the accident. „When any technological development becomes a totem of national prestige‟ he 
argued, „common sense flies out of the window.'263  
 
In conclusion, it is important not to judge the social popularity of atomic power in the 
fifties through sceptical lenses borne of later decades. As Joachim Radkau, a respected 
environmental historian, has shown, the original nuclear planners often sought solutions to the 
same problems that traditionally bothered environmentalists; i.e. producing renewable clean 
energy with minimal mining and drilling
264
. Radkau consequently warned against seeing 
atomic energy in the environmental sense of „good against evil‟ and argued that civil nuclear 
power was not as socially unpopular as previously thought. 
Socially, the most influential aspect of atomic power station construction was in 
demonstrating fault lines in British policy-making and the interaction between government 
and society. Westminster offered, via atomic stations, a chance for local regions to be 
associated with dynamic and exciting new technologies. This in turn would attract investment 
and create jobs, and thus many local authorities were keen to site atomic plants in their areas. 
Nonetheless, problems arose between the local government and public strata; the 
government‟s approach has been criticised for being heavy-handed, and Elizabeth Rough 
identified the method of commissioning atomic stations as following essentially a „Decide- 
Announce-Defend‟ strategy265. This in itself is evidence that there were some objections by 
local populations, although within this, the level of opposition on scientific grounds was 
surprising.  
The true level of public understanding of atomic power is debateable; it is probably 
most rational to assume that whilst laymen did not understand atomic science there were still 
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appreciable concerns for safety in the immediate vicinities of the new stations, almost 
certainly fuelled by worries about military uses. The lack of information released by 
government may indeed have let fears surrounding atomic power grow unchecked in a society 
which was initially largely supportive. The media also were far from critical and continued 
their broadly positive attitude for the remainder of the decade. For its part, government policy 
was often blunt and rested on public goodwill towards progress overriding concerns for local 
safety. High-level decision-making was not greatly influenced by social unease, a reflection 
of both the governmental will to modernise by force and the general lack of concerted public 
opposition. In any case, by 1959, despite declining coal consumption and the concurrent 
accumulation of stocks, Macmillan was keen to support nuclear power from „the long-term 
point of view of our economy and our national prestige‟266. Thus was demonstrated the 
momentum which civilian nuclear power had gained; it had become so fundamental to 
Britain‟s image that returning to previous methods was undesirable. For better or worse, civil 
atomic power was now well-established in the British social consciousness. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 In conclusion, atomic energy occupied a significant role in post-war international 
history. Christopher Hinton summarised Britain‟s meteoric rise and subsequent stalling 
succinctly: „we started four wartime years behind America; after only ten years we had a lead 
of at least two years‟ he claimed, before adding „it took only another seven years to throw that 
lead away'
267
. Despite its relatively fleeting nature, the influence of civil atomic power was 
not restricted to being a feature of complementary contemporary changes; the technology in 
Britain often produced its own independent impact and the field deviated from important 
political trends on several significant occasions.  
Nowhere was this more evident than the Anglo-American relationship, where greater 
co-operation and British financial dependence on the United States contrasted starkly with the 
awkward breakdowns of the relatively strong wartime atomic understanding. To an extent this 
reflected Britain‟s wider position; she was no longer an equal partner but a material burden on 
a technologically-superior American structure which was collecting abandoned economic and 
defence commitments. Fear of communism and weak alliances propagated American distrust 
for British security (exemplified by the McMahon Act), foreshadowing inadequate 
agreements that freed industrial atomic energy but confirmed American hegemony. Although 
Britain was still identified as the scientific leader of the Commonwealth, the breakdown of her 
key nuclear alliance stimulated a new, independent, atomic identity wherein the only 
productive strategy was the one adopted by Attlee and later Churchill, which John Baylis 
labelled „consistent, patient, and determined‟, based fundamentally on attaining self-
sufficiency
268
. This view has enjoyed some support; Robin Edmonds contended that the 
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British endured American reluctance (bordering on national humiliation) precisely because 
select political and scientific elites understood that Britain‟s best hope of nuclear capability 
lay in salvaging what they could from wartime agreements whilst beginning independent 
projects and „thinking for themselves‟269. Acquiring nuclear weapons was non-negotiable; 
Britain‟s defence, if not her notions of great power status demanded them and thus some form 
of atomic infrastructure was unavoidable.  
Atomic energy offered Britain a desperately longed-for symbol of continued 
independence amidst signs of imperial decline and achieved recognition in political 
consciousness as a field in which Britain would have to act totally independently on a 
continent which was experiencing greater American economic and military intervention. This 
self-reliance had a political price; scientists would have increased influence in the future of 
atomic energy as politicians were forced to grant greater autonomy to technological experts. 
British scientists first squeezed what they could from the inadequate post-war settlements, 
laboriously breaking information down into highly-specific „exchangeable‟ categories, 
producing the capacity to proceed independently using theoretical knowledge developed 
during the war. This expertise was just enough to keep the atomic ball rolling during the 
breakdown of political initiatives in the late nineteen-forties.  
Owing initially to the close personal relationships of Churchill, the role of science in 
state decision-making structures expanded as the atomic program grew, first by the inclusion 
of a CSA at the MoD and then through the UKAEA in 1954. This was part of a wider trend; 
as science and technology became increasingly complex and important to national interests 
governments eyed scientific processes with increasing awareness, a phenomenon articulated 
by Joseph Camilleri in his „bureaucratisation of science‟ thesis270. The far-reaching 
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momentum caused by this shift, within which atomic energy was a driving component, led 
directly to the creation of Harold Wilson‟s Ministry of Technology in 1964. Atomic power 
raised the question of who was best-placed to act on scientific matters; the international 
scientific community certainly had a reach beyond the political sphere, and the agreement on 
how far science should influence state was fundamental to the new British understanding of 
the role of government in the new technological age. However, there were limits; whilst the 
UKAEA did consolidate the body of scientific opinion into a more useful form for political 
digestion it was not a direct decision-making body, committees could be established, as they 
were to review Euratom entry, although their recommendations were not always adhered to. 
However, although atomic scientists became a force for consultation, what ultimately 
kept nuclear energy relevant in political minds were the small contributions of various forces 
to the overall picture. The need to obtain nuclear weapons, reduce coal consumption, cut post-
Suez oil dependence and remain free of Soviet influence all combined to produce a policy 
which arguably only the need for atomic bombs had made insistent. In terms of traditional 
identity sources, atomic power was simultaneously an acknowledgement that Britain could no 
longer successfully affect the Middle East or retain her position as „King Coal‟; new fuels 
would be sourced from politically secure former colonies which were eager to test their new 
national identities against the erstwhile patron. Atomic engineering also demanded greater, 
rarer expertise; Britain began to self-define as a technocratic state which bemoaned the 
shortage of scientists in the way the politicians of 1946 had criticised the lack of coal miners. 
The debate over the precise balance of these factors has been intense with some scholars, 
notably Margaret Gowing, strongly underlining military requirements
271
. However, as the 
discussion has developed, fuel security and domestic energy concerns have attained an 
increased importance and strong assertions to that effect have been made by Peter Lloyd-
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Jones
272
. This study has therefore found a position in this debate, articulating the interaction 
between various factors and demonstrating that although plutonium was the overriding 
immediate concern, fuel supplies and coal scarcity greatly informed the manner in which 
atomic power developed and subsequently influenced international relations. Britain‟s post-
war position was strongly implied in her sources of energy; her strength would now rest on 
pioneering technology within a loose Commonwealth framework. However, this sphere also 
proved complex; Britain‟s relations with her old dominions were strained by uranium 
negotiations, lessening the potential value of close collaboration at a point when Europe was 
looming larger. 
Nonetheless, the success in developing peaceful atomic power provoked a transatlantic 
reaction. Attlee had originally hoped that independence would encourage America to resume 
information sharing; by the mid-fifties British politicians and scientists alike feared American 
interference in European markets. Eisenhower‟s „Atoms for Peace‟ scheme was born of the 
need for positive propaganda and American concern for Soviet military, and British 
commercial, applications of atomic power. While existing scholars, for example Richard 
Hewlett and John Krige, have stressed the former factors, this study has emphasised the 
impact of Britain‟s gains in producing policy change, expanding the debate273. In any case, the 
scheme re-engaged American interest in international action at the same time as she was 
trying to construct a strong Western European bloc, bringing Britain‟s role sharply into focus. 
The UK had a credible gravity for European states and partnerships with the UKAEA were 
attractive, but her political reticence prevailed during the period of genuine British atomic 
leadership in the nineteen-fifties. The fleeting nature of Britain‟s atomic prowess can be partly 
attributed to the decision to pursue depreciating Magnox plants, but also to the way politicians 
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failed to „cash in‟ her atomic lead for political and economic gain. The limits of scientific 
influence were demonstrated as scientists at the UKAEA argued against atomic integration. 
Indeed, they had good reason; Euratom membership offered little that could not be obtained 
independently and would compromise Britain‟s ability to utilise her advanced position. 
Nonetheless, atomic power as a tool of integration was overrun by political initiatives in 
Europe and eventually also in Britain, where Macmillan attempted to offer the sector as a 
bargain to ameliorate the Six. In Europe this trend was insignificant; the Six had no notable 
atomic infrastructure and so combined development was logical, especially after the success 
of the ECSC. For Britain, atomic science was a card to be released carefully for an advantage, 
although this was confused by conflicting attitudes towards European integration, particularly 
the EC.  
The debate over Britain‟s atomic role in Europe has been complex; Henry Nau 
stressed that Britain, preferring a loose Europe, would only stretch to supporting the European 
Nuclear Energy Association, as this „reflected an existing organizational consensus‟ and was 
„designed less to promote integration or development of common resources than to influence 
the debate over the future external posture of a united nuclear Europe‟274. However, this was 
contested by Christian Deubner, who asserted that Euratom could not be considered a single 
entity in terms of treaty negotiation, as members were still free to enter the capitalistic 
uranium market and negotiate individual contracts with those offering the cheapest supply. 
However, although the UKAEA‟s motivations in declining such an unreliable project, 
particularly from an advantageous position, are clear, Westminster often experienced 
difficulty reconciling this to wider objectives
275
. This developed a nuance in the new national 
identity; scientific prestige and engineering had been key to developing the new post-war 
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Britain, but by the early sixties Macmillan was persuaded that atomic advances should no 
longer be regarded as „crown jewels‟ and could be utilised as collateral for wider political 
goals. Science may have carved out a larger role in national life but it ultimately remained the 
servant of larger supranational objectives which politicians in the nineteen-fifties and sixties 
set themselves, particularly on the continent. 
Nonetheless, although civil atomic power was a credible instrument of foreign policy 
it was also regularly at the forefront of debate on the role of science within the state and of the 
social context in which Britain began to self-define as it entered the nineteen-sixties. The 
decline of coal struck at one of Britain‟s defining products, the source of both her 
metaphorical and physical power; in contrast, the new atomic stations were untested but 
dynamic and enticed ambitious local governments which actively sought to attract the new 
industry. Trust in atomic power was generally high, and although local opposition was more 
substantial than has often been accepted, civil generation separated itself from nuclear 
weapons in the public consciousness, undoubtedly a large factor in its development. On a 
national level, there was little concerted opposition and the media showed minimal visible 
antipathy in the early stages, contributing substantially to installing atomic power as a key 
component of Britain‟s new technological identity. Even after worrying incidents like 
Windscale, faith in nuclear stations prevailed, although the government‟s failure to 
communicate effectively with the public set a worrying precedent which arguably damaged 
long-term trust more than frank admission of facts would have done. Nonetheless, despite 
these wobbles, atomic power retained an important stake in the public consciousness 
throughout the period of study and solidified its position in the new scientific national 
identity. 
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Even when it was not at the cutting-edge, the debate over atomic power often 
influenced how parallel power relationships were negotiated. As an independent entity, the 
sector produced nuanced relationship dynamics as Britain‟s atomic experience in the 
nineteen-fifties often contradicted her otherwise comprehensive international step-down. Was 
this because of a genuinely new national identity taking time to emerge or was the entire 
venture merely representative of the excessive resource allocation now required by a nation 
desperate to retain its prestige? The question also remains of how far the Conservative success 
in new technology was obfuscated by the „swinging sixties‟ narrative of Wilson‟s Labour and 
„New Britain‟. What can be ascertained is that civil atomic power informed contemporary 
debates to a considerable extent; Britain was not utterly dependent on the United States, she 
was not wholly integrated into Europe and she no longer commanded unquestioning respect 
from her old dominions. Atomic power proved that these relationships all contained potential 
for redefinition and adjustment as Britain moved from self-identifying through imperial-age 
trappings like coal production and colonies to a technologically-driven society striving to 
build Churchill‟s „empires of the mind‟ as a replacement for fading geographical domination. 
Although born of military necessity, civil atomic science was contributing substantially to the 
„White Heat‟ of industry and the national understanding of Britain‟s wider position long 
before 1964.     
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